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Case No. 20160485-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
DESEAN MICHAEL GOINS,
Defendant/Petitioner.

Brief of Respondent
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court
of Appeals in State v. Goins, 2016 UT App 57, 370 P.3d 942 (Addendum A).
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(5)
(West 2009).

INTRODUCTION
Petitioner DeSean Goins separately accosted two homeless men in
Pioneer Park with a knife. Both victims testified at the preliminary hearing,
and Goins cross-examined them without limitation. Estrada did not appear
for h ial, and, despite diligent efforts, the State was unable to locate him.
4

The trial court found Estrada unavailable and admitted his preliminary
hearing testhnony over Goins' confrontation objection.

Goins appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that
confrontation was satisfied under Crawford v. Washington because Estrada
was unavailable and Goins had both a prior opportunity and a similar
motive to cross-examine him at the preliminary hearing.
The court of appeals' ruling is consistent with a long, unbroken line of
cases from both the United States Supreme Court and this Court holding
[

..

,

~

that a preliminary hearing can afford an adequate opportunity for prior
cross-examination. Goins shows no compelling reason to depart from this
precedent.
Through new counsel, Goins sought rehearing to challenge his
appellate counsel's effectiveness for failing to challenge on appeal h·ial
counsel's effectiveness in submitting an erroneous self-defense jury
instruction. The court of appeals properly denied the petition because it
exceeded the scope of rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. That
decision is consistent with this Court's long-standing precedent.

Goins

reJ.?1-ains able to pursue his ineffectiveness claims on post-conviction review.
While this Court could, in its discretion, decide to entertain Goins' s
challenges on certiorari review, it should require that Goins pursue postconviction review, especi~lly where his claims do not establish appellate
counsel's ineffectiveness.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
This Court granted review on two questions.
1. "Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that a witness
whose preliminary hearing testimony was admitted at trial was unavailable
and that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that his Sixth Amendment
right to confront witnesses against him was violated by the presentation of
the preliminary hearing testimony at his trial." Order, September 12, 2016.
2. "Whether the court of appeals erred in denying Petitioners petition
for rehearing raising new arguments that trial and appellate counsel
provided ineffective assistance." Order, September 12, 2016.

Standard of R_eview. This Court reviews the court of appeals' decision
for correctness. Brierly v. Layton City, 2016 UT 46, ,I18, _

P.3d _ .

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
reproduced in Addendum B:
United States Constitution, Amendment VI;
Utah Constitution, Article I, §12;
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 35;
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 14;
Utah Rules of Evidence 804.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Summary offacts.

Gabriel Estrada (Count 3):

Gabriel Estrada needed a place to sleep and thought he would "be
safe" at an apartment belonging to his friend Star and Petitioner Desean
Goins. R202:2-4, 9-10. He slept at the apartment for several nights in July
2013, but wasn't comfortable being there long. R202:9-912.

The morning of July 13, Estrada woke up, got ready, and left the
apartment, heading for the men's shelter in downtown Salt Lake City.
R202:5-7, 10-11. Goins and Star found him outside the shelter later that

morning.

R202:4, 10-11.

Goins approached Estrada waiving a knife,

cussing, and accusing him in "vulgar" language of taking Goins' s cell
phone. R202:6-7, 11-12. Esh·ada denied taking the phone, told Goins it was
Goins's problem, and walked away. R202:7, 12.
Joshua Omar (Counts 1 and 2):

Joshua Omar was living at the n1en's shelter in July 2013. R167:121.
He was "[v]ery close to Gabriel [Estrada] and considered. him to be his
"street son."

R167:124-25.

Estrada, in turn, considered Omar to be his

"street mother." R167:124.
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On July 13, 2013, Omar was sleeping on his blanket in Pioneer Park
when his friend Star woke him up, asking if he had seen Estrada because
Estrada allegedly had stolen Goins' s cell phone from Goins' s apartment.
R167:121-24.

Goins, holding a sling bag and waiving a knife, started

making the same accusations from ten or twelve feet away fr01n Omar.
R167:125-26; State's Exh. 1.

But Goins moved closer as he spoke,

threatening that Omar had "better tell the truth.'' R167:126. When Goins
stepped onto Omar's blanket, he violated Omar's personal boundaries, and
Omar shoved him away. R167:125, 127.
In response, Goins "attacked" Omar, lunging at the unarmed man.
R167:127, 143, 154.

The two ended up on the ground wrestling and

throwing punches at each other. R167:127, 143-45, 154, 160-61.

At one

point, Omar got on top of Goins and pinned him to the ground. R167:127,
140, 144. Goins grabbed Omar's right earlobe between his teeth, yanked his

head back, bit off the earlobe, and spit it out on the ground. R167:127-28;
-~

State's Exh. 3, 4, 6-8. Omar reached for his ear, saw the blood, and realized
what had happened. R167:128, 140-41. He hit Goins once more, then stood
up. R167:129-30.
As Goins stood, he grabbed his knife fro1n where it had fallen on the

ground. R167:141-42. The two men yelled at each other and ran around the
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blanket before stopping on opposite sides. R167:130, 141-44. Goins lunged
twice at the unarmed Omar with the knife, stabbing him once on the upper
left side of his torso. R167:131, 139, 141, 145, 154, 156; State's Exh. 9. Omar
then left to get help at the nearby police station while Star led Goins away
from the park. R167:129, 131, 155-56, 158.
As Donald Myers parked his car next to Pioneer Park, he noticed a
fight between two men about ten feet away from his car. R167:151-52. He
watched the men fight until he saw Goins holding a knife. R167:152-55. He
immediately called 911. R167:55.

It appeared to Myers that Omar was

defending himself while Goins-who appeared motivated by anger and
was yelling about a phone-was the aggressor. R167:157, 159.
A responding officer stopped Goins and Star near the park and found
a knife inside Goins' s bag. R167:165-67. He noted several "very small" cuts
like scratches on Goins's face suggesting that Goins had recently been in a
fight. R167:169-71. Goins told the officer that he had been fighting with
Omar, that he bit Omar's ear to get Omar off of him, and that he stabbed
Omar with the knife in self-defense. R167:174-76.
B.

Summary of proceedings.

The State charged Goins with two counts of aggravated assault, both
third-degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103(1) (West
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Supp. 2014), and one count of second-degree felony mayhem, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-105 (West 2004). R16-18.

The Preliminary Hearing.

Both victims testified at a preliminary

hearing seven weeks after the charged assaults.

R23-24; R202.

Goins'

counsel cross-examined Estrada without objection by the State or restriction
by the judge. R202:2-13. The prosecutor's questioning spans about six
pages; defense counsel's cross spans five pages.

Id.

The judge found

probable cause and bound Goins over as charged. R23-24; R202:33.

Pre-trial. Two 1nonths later, the parties appeared for the first day of
trial only to discover they had no jury pool and could not proceed that day.
R166:2-3. The parties and the trial court decided to proceed with trial the

next day, on what would have been day two of the originally scheduled
trial. R166:2-3. The prosecutor then took the opportunity to acknowledge
that Estrada had not appeared for trial and moved that he be declared
unavailable and that his preliminary hearing testimony be admitted at trial
the next day.

R166:3 (argument and ruling in Addendum C).

The

prosecutor explained that because both victims in this case were homeless
and had no phones, they were difficult to locate and required "creative"
efforts. R166:3-4; R167:16. Accordingly, before the prelim.inary hearing, the
prosecutor had used the Salt Lake City Bike Police to look for the men based
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largely on a description of Omar's missing earlobe. R166:3-4. Both men
were found, appeared at the hearing, and brought with them a pastor from
the K-2 Church who dealt with community outreach-getting to know the
people in the area and helping them when needed. Id. The prosecutor took
the opportunity to arrange for the pastor to be the contact person for both
men so they could be notified through him of a trial date. R166:4. Both men
agreed, and the prosecutor remained in contact with the pastor. Id.
The· prosecutor later emailed the subpoenas for both victims to the
pastor, expressly including both days of the scheduled two-day trial.
R166:4; R167:10, 16. Thereafter, the pastor informed the prosecutor that he
had, in fact, served both subpoenas on the victims and informed them that
they needed to be at the trial. 1 R166:4.
The prosecutor maintained contact with the pastor as trial neared to
ensure that both victims were still available. Id. At one point, the pastor
mentioned that Estrada had "come into some trouble" but was still around.

Id. The pastor left for a new job shortly thereafter, and the prosecutor dealt
with the replacement pastor, Jason. Id.
Jason verified that the previous pastor had served the subpoena on
Estrada and that Estrada had been in jail. Id. When the prosecutor followed
1

No return of service appears in the record.
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up on the information, he found that Estrada had been released from jail
nearly a month before trial. R166:4-5. The prosecutor checked the jail twice
more before trial, but did not locate Estrada. Id.
Both Jason and Omar later told the prosecutor that they had lost
contact with Estrada. Id. Omar and Estrada had "a falling out," and neither
Omar nor Jason knew where to find Estrada. R166:5. Estrada stopped
hanging around the area, was not involved with his normal "crowd," and
did not get in touch with either Jason or Omar. R166:5. Although the
prosecutor requested that Jason watch for Estrada, Jason did not see him in
the days leading up to trial. Id.
Goins accepted the prosecutor's proffer of his efforts to serve Estrada
and get him to appear at trial and argued that they were insufficient under
rule 804, Utah Rules of Evidence.

R166:6, 12.

He also argued that

permitting use of Estrada's preliminary hearing testimony would violate
Goins' s constitutional right to confrontation because the motive for crossexamination at the preliminary hearing was different than would exist at
trial, where credibility was a factor. R166:9-11.
The judge found that Estrada was unavailable under rule 804.
R166:12. Specifically, the judge found that the State utilized a "reasonable
means of process," its efforts succeeded in actually informing Estrada of the
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trial dates, and Estrada was present at the preliminary hearing and, thus,
knew that the proceedings were moving forward. R166:12-13.
Further, the judge found

that Goins enjoyed a meaningful

opportunity for cross-examination at the preliminary hearing where his
counsel actively examined Estrada without objection or restriction and
asked about the "exact incidents" that were at issue at trial. R166:18-19.
Rule 804 requires nothing more, she noted. R166:19. Accordingly, the judge
held that Estrada's preliminary hearing testimony could be used at trial
without violating Goins' s constitutional confrontation rights. Id.

Trial. At trial the next day, Estrada again failed to appear. R267:3-4.
Goins unsuccessfully renewed his objection to admission of Estrada's
preliminary hearing testimony.

Id.

The jurors heard an audio tape of

Estrada's testimony during the State's case. R167:149-50. After a day of
testimony, they acquitted Goins of mayhem, convicted him of aggravated
assault involving Omar, and convicted him of the lesser offense of using or
threatening to use a dangerous weapon in the fight with Estrada. R73, 7576; R168:52.

Court of Appeals' decision. Goins timely appealed, arguing both (1) that
Estrada was not "unavailable" where the State made no good faith effort to
locate him and to properly serve him with a subpoena; and (2) that he did
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not have the requisite opportunity or similar motive to fully cross-examine
Estrada at the preliminary hearing. Aplt.Br. 5-16. Goins argued that the
preliminary hearing was an inadequate opportunity for cross-examination
for three reasons:

the absence of a right to confront witnesses at the

preliminary hearing; the limited purpose of a preliminary hearing; and the
different motive his counsel possessed for cross-examination at the
preliminary hearing. Id.
The court of appeals-consistent with its own, this Court's, and
United States Supreme Court precedent-disagreed. Goins, 2016 UT App
57, ,r,rB-20 (in Add. A). The court first explained that Utah law requires that
the State make "every reasonable effort" to procure the witness but did not
require that '" every lead, no matter how nebulous,"' "'be tracked to the
ends of the earth."' Id. at ,r,r9-10, 14 (quoting Poe v. Turner, 490 F.2d 329,331
(10th Cir. 1974)).

Comparing this case with precedent from both Utah

appellate courts, the court of appeals determined that the State "went to
considerable effort" in this case to obtain Estrada's testimony at trial,
including maintaining a connection with Estrada through a person whom
he trusted, getting a subpoena to Estrada through that person, and, after
~strada disappeared, trying to locate him through the most likely means
possible, right to "the eve of trial."

Id. at ,r,rl0-13, 15. The court also

-11-

acknowledged that in addition to the State's reasonable actions, Goins
acquiesced in both the State's method of keeping in touch with Estrada and
the means of serving him a subpoena. Id. at if 15. Consequently, the court
detennined that the State made the necessary reasonable efforts to locate
Estrada and affirmed the finding of unavailability. Id.
The court also rejected Goins' s challenge to the preliminary hearing
itself. First, the court explained that preliminary hearing testimony of an
unavailable witness was admissible at trial under rule 804(b)(1)(B), Utah
Rules of Evidence, because the circumstances of a preliminary hearing
"'closely approximat[e] those"' of a typical trial.

Id. at if16 (quoting

California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970)). Further, the court held that the
rule required the opportunity for cross-examination, not the exercise of that
opportunity, and that a preliminary hearing provides "an effective
opportunity for confrontation." Id. at if if17-18. Goins had that opportunity
in this case. Id. at 118.
Finally, the court of appeals sympathized with Goh1s' s claim that the
limited purpose of the preliminary hearing-determination of probable
cause-dictated a motive for her cross-examination at that hearing that
differed from the motive she would later have at trial. Id. at ,119. But the
court found the argument foreclosed by this Court's decision in State v.
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..,
C.'.1

Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981), which Goins did not address. Id. at ,I,I1920.

Because Brooks rejected identical arguments and held that both

proceedings involved the motivation of establishing the innocence of the
accused,· the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's admission of
Estrada's preliminary hearing testimony. Id. at if 20.

Rehearing petition. Goins obtained new counsel and filed a petition for
rehearing, urging the court of appeals to consider new issues: the accuracy
of a self-defense jury instruction, ineffective assistance of trial counsel for
proposing the instruction, and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for
not challenging the instruction and trial counsel's effectiveness on direct
appeal. Rehearing Pet. 3-11. The court of appeals sought input from the
parties about the propriety of raising new issues in a rehearing petition
(Order dated April 25, 2016), then denied the petition without elaboration
(Order dated May 17, 2016).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Issue I: Goins argues that the court of appeals erroneously affirmed

the use of Estrada's preliminary hearing testimony at trial.

He claims

Estrada was not unavailable because: (1) Estrada was not formally
subpoenaed; and (2) the preliminary hearing did not provide Goins an
opportunity for cross-examination with a motive similar to that used for
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trial. His claim that the limited nature of the preliminary hearing renders
any opportunity for cross-examination inadequate contradicts over a
century of precedent from the United States Supreme Court, this Court, and
the court of appeals. Goins provides no compelling reason to depart from
this precedent. Instead, the long, unbroken line of precedent provides that
his opportunity to cross-examine Estrada at the preliminary hearing
satisfied the confrontation clause. Thus, Goins does not show that the use at
trial of Estrada's preliminary hearing testimony violated Goins' s Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses.
Issue II: The court of appeals properly denied Goins' s rehearing

petition which sought review of new clailns of ineffective assistance of trial
and appellate counsel. The new claims were outside the scope of rule 35,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure because they were neither" overlooked"
nor "misapprehended" by the court of appeals in its published decision.
Further, the court's decision was consistent with long-standing decisions
from this Court. Finally, a procedure already exists for presentations of
Goins's claims which he should follow.

Because the court of appeals

properly denied the rehearing petition, this Court should affirm without
proceeding further.
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Should this Court proceed, it could, but should not, consider the
merits of Goins' s new claims because a remedy already exists and because
the claims establish no reversible error to justify unusual any treatment.
In any event, Goins establishes neither deficient performance nor
prejudice in the handling of jury instruction 24 regarding self-defense.

ARGUMENT

I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED
THAT ESTRADA WAS UNAVAILABLE AT TRIAL AND
THAT GOINS HAD AN ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO
CROSS-EXAMINE HIM AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING

Goins argues that the court of appeals erroneously affirmed the
admission of Estrada's preliminary hearing testimony at h·ial. Pet.Br. 9-32.
He contends that use of the testimony violated his right to confrontation
guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions because: (1) the witness
cannot be unavailable where the prosecution failed to formally subpoena
him; and (2) the preliminary hearing did not provide the requisite
opportunity to fully cross-examine the witness as required by rule 804, Utah
Rules of Evidence. Id.
Goins is mistaken on both points. First, formal service of a subpoena
is not a 1nandatory prerequisite to a finding of unavailability; rather, the
State must merely make every reasonable effort to produce the witness. The
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prosecutor used ample reasonable means to procure the homeless witness's
attendance at trial, including but not limited to informal service of a
subpoena. The finding of unavailability was, therefore, correct.
Second, not only Brooks, but a long unbroken line of decisions from
both the United States Supreme Court and this Court show that preliminary
hearing testimony can be admissible at trial where the declarant is
unavailable. Goins offers no cmnpelling reason to depart from that
precedent.
A. Preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable declarant
has long been admissible under the Confrontation Clause.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects an
accused's right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him" at trial.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58,

iJ 9, 218 P.3d 590.

But this right is not absolute. The Confrontation Clause does not bar the use
of all hearsay at trial, but only of "testimonial" hearsay.

Crawford v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). A hearsay statement is "testimonial" if,
in making it, the declarant "bears testimony" against a defendant. Id. at 51.
Testimonial hearsay includes, among other things, "prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 59, 68.
But even testimonial hearsay is admissible at h·ial if (1) the declarant
is unavailable to testify and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity to
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cross-examine the declarant regarding the prior statements. Id. at 68. Prior
testimony-whether given at a prior trial or a preliminary hearing-has
long been admissible where these conditions are met.

Id. at 57 (citing

Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 241 (1895)); see also State v. Menzies, 889
P.2d 393, 403 (1994).
Rule 804(b)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence, expressly provides for the
admission of prior testimony if both conditions are satisfied. Utah R. Evid.
804(b)(1); State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ~17, 314 P.3d 1014, cert. denied
320 P.3d 676 (2014). It states that a witness is unavailable if, as is relevant
here, he "is absent from the trial" and the State "has not been able, by
process or other reasonable means, to procure the [witness's] attendance."
Utah R. Evid. 804(a)(5); Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ~17.

It "'must be

practically impossible to produce the witness in court. It is not enough to
show that the witness would be uncomfortable on the stand or that
testifying would be stressful.
produce the witness."'

Every reasonable effort must be made to

State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ,r1s, 84 P.3d 1183
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(quoting State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108, 1113 (Utah 1989)); see also State v.
Drawn, 791 P.2d 890,893 (Utah App. 1990)/

B. The absent, homeless witness was unavailable to testify at
trial.

Goins contests the court of appeals' determination that the
prosecution made every reasonable effort to procure Estrada's attendance at
trial. Pet.Br. 11. He claims that Estrada was not unavailable because the
State never sought to "actually serve a subpoena upon him" by
"conventional means." Id. at 10-11. But formal service of a subpoena is not
a prerequisite to an unavailability finding, and Goins fails to challenge the
reasonableness of the other efforts the prosecution made to keep tabs on
2

Goins claims that this unavailability standard is "perhaps" even
"more stringent" than the federal standard under the Confrontation Clause,
and that the federal Confrontation Clause standard itself requires a
"stronger showing of unavailability and reliability than does evidentiary
Rule 804." Pet.Br. 14-15.
Goins is mistaken. First, his sole support for a "stronger" federal
constitutional standard is dicta in a footnote in a Fifth Circuit case saying
the Confrontation Clause "may" require a sh·onger showing of
unavailability and reliability than does federal rule 804. Id. at 14 (citing
Ecker v. Scott, 69 F.3d 69, 72, n.3 (5th Cir. 1995)). But Ecker neither develops
nor applies a "stronger showing" for unavailability.
Second, the state standard Goins labels "more stringent" than the
federal standard is actually the federal standard- Webb based its holding on
its reading of federal precedent. See 779 P.2d at 1113. Goins cites no case
interpreting the standard more stringently than the federal standard from
which it derives. Thus, Goins provides no basis for a separate state
constitutional review, and this Court should proceed under the standard
recited above. See Drawn, 791 P.2d at 893, n2.
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Estrada and ensure his presence at trial, including: repeatedly checking with
the pastor to ensure both Estrada's continued presence in the area and his
continued link to the prosecutor through the pastor; repeatedly checking the
jails once informed Estrada was having trouble and had been arrested;
alerting those who were familiar with Estrada and were most likely to see
him to watch for him; and making a final check with the jail the eve before
trial. Goins, 2016 UT App 57, ~14.
It has long been true in Utah that Rule 804(a)(5) does not require "' a

patently futile attempt to serve a subpoena on a potential witness ... whose
physical location and address are completely unknown."'

Id. at iJ10

(quoting Brown v. Harn; Heathman, Inc., 744 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Utah App
1987)). The Heathman court expressly rejected a claim that under the rule,
the proponent of such testimony "must always attempt service of process."
744 P.2d at 1018.

As Heathman noted, the rule itself is phrased in the

disjunctive: a witness is deemed "unavailable" where the party sought to
procure the witness's attendance "by process or other reasonable means."

Id. (quoting Utah R. Evid. 804(a)(5)) (emphasis added). See also State v.
Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 645-46 (Utah 1995) (finding efforts to be satisfactory
without service of process).

Goins acknowledges this law, but fails to

discuss or refute it, and offers no contrary authority expressly requiring
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formal

service of process as a prerequisite to all unavailability

determinations under the·rule. Pet.Br. 11.
Goins claims that the prosecution ignored two opportunities to
attempt formal service on Estrada, and thereby fell short of the effort
required to establish unavailability.

Id. at 11-13.

But Goins has not

established that service by "conventional means" was even possible. The
fact that the pastor was able to serve Estrada does not show that an officer
would "surely" have succeeded in attempting to do the same. Id. at 12.
Esh·ada was homeless.

His physical location and address were never

known and he had no phone. No one knew where to find him at any given
time. The prosecutor was not aware of his presence in the jail until after he
had been released.

R166:4-5.

Unlike Omar, Estrada had no distin~tive

attributes to enable officers to locate him, and there was no reason to believe
he would allow officers to approach him. Reliance on the pastor was the
most likely avenue of successful service and, hence, was reasonable under
the circumstances.
In any event, the issue is not whether additional avenues of service
were available to the prosecutor; it is whether the prosecutor's efforts were
reasonable. See Utah R. Evid. 804(a)(5); see also Menzies, 889 P.2d at 403.
Even accepting Goins' view that the pastor's service on the witness was
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flawed, the pastor's effort clearly qualified as "other reasonable means"
which

in

fact

accomplished

what

"proper"

service

would

have

accomplished, informing the witness of the time and place of trial and his
need to attend. See Utah R. Evid. 801(1)(5). That was the proffer given by
the prosecutor, accepted by Goins, and credited by the judge, who
acknowledged that the witness's actual knowledge of the information was
"key" to her ruling. R166:12-13. That was all the constitution requires.
In this Court, for the first time, Goins argues that the court of appeals
should have reversed the trial court's unavailability finding because the
prosecution failed to give timely notice of the witness's expected
unavailability. Pet.Br. 16-17. This claim does not warrant review, not only
because it was not timely raised, but because it lacks support. See DeBry v.

Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995) (refusing to address on certiorari review
a claim not raised in the court of appeals or originating in that court's
challenged decision). It rests solely on a Massachusetts case dealing with a
witness who was deemed unavailable due to illness.

Commonwealth v.

Housewright, 25 N.E.3d 273, 283 (Mass. 2015) (reversing the unavailability
finding for reasons other than the lack of notice). The analysis in that case
has no bearing on the availability of the homeless witness in this case.
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The State need not demonstrate that it did everything humanly
possible to procure the presence of a witness at trial; it need only use
"reasonable means" to procure his attendance. Utah R. Crim. P. 804(a)(5);

Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ifl7. The prosecution's conduct under the facts
here meets that standard.

Accordingly, the court of appeals properly

affirmed the trial court's determination that Estrada was unavailable at trial.
C. Preliminary hearings can provide an adequate opportunity for
cross-examining a witness who is later deemed unavailable at
trial.

Goins argues that the court of appeals erred in holding that the
preliminary hearing provided the requisite "opportunity and similar
motive" to develop cross-examination of Estrada for purposes of both rule
804 and the Confrontation Clause. 3 Pet.Br. 19-31. He argues that the nature
and purpose of the preliminary hearing in Utah differs substantially from a
trial, that defense counsel often pursue their cross-examination at a
preliminary hearing with motives which are wholly dissimilar to their
motives for cross-examination at h·ial, and that the viability of the per se rule
in Brooks that was relied on by the court of appeals in their decision in this

case is "heavily in doubt." Id.
3

It should be noted that Goins' s trial counsel conceded that he had
the opportunity to examine Estrada at · the preliminary hearing and
proceeded to challenge only the motive for the examination. R166:10;
Pet.Br. 19.
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Not only Brooks, but a long, unbroken line of

Goins is mistaken.

decisions from both the United States Supreme Court and this Court show
that preliminary hearing testimony can be admissible at trial where the
declarant is unavailable.

Because Goins offers no compelling reason to

depart from that precedent, this Court should refuse to do so.
1. Preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable declarant
has long been admissible under the Confrontation
Clause.

As to cross-examination, the Sixth Amendment guarantees only the

opportunity to cross-examine. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 ("the Sixth
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a
prior opportunity for cross-examination") (emphasis added). As this Court
II

has long recognized, even where a defendant may have elected to forgo
cross-examination" that

II

does not mean that the opportunity was not

available." State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1357 (Utah 1986); see State v. Pecht,
2002 UT 41, ,I39, 48 P.3d 931; State v. Jolley, 571 P.2d 582, 586 (Utah 1977); see

also Barger v. Oklahoma, 238 F. App' x. 343, 346-47 (10th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Williams, 116 F. App'x. 890, 891 (9th Cir. 2004); Simmons v. State, 234
S.W.3d 321, 326 (Ark. App. 2006); People v. Williams, 181 P.3d 1035, 1061
(Cal. 2008); People v. Yost, 749 N.W.2d 753, 774-75 (Mich. App. 2008); State v.

Artis, 215 S.W.3d 327, 335 (Mo. App. 2007).
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Thus, the Sixth Amend1nent does not guarantee cross-examination
will take place at all, let alone "cross-examination that is effective in
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." United

States v. Owens 484 U.S. 554,559 (1988) (citations 01nitted); Pecht, 2002 UT 41,
,I39; see also People v. Cowan, 236 P.3d 1074, 1126 (Cal. 2010) ("Nothing in

Crauiford casts doubt on the continuing vitality of Owens."). Whether a prior
opportunity is" adequate" depends on the facts of a case.
Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have long held
that the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness may be
admissible at trial. 4 More than a century ago, the United States Supreme
Court addressed this possibility in Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237
(1985). Mattox was convicted of a murder in Indian territory. Id.at 239. His
conviction was reversed on appeal, and he was tried a second time, which
4

The Supreme Court excluded the preliminary hearing testimony of
an unavailable witness in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-08 (1965). But the
problems in Pointer-that Pointer lacked counsel at the preliminary hearing
and the government made no attempt to procure the out-of-state witnessare not present here. Other Supreme Court cases excluding preliminary
hearing testimony on confrontation grounds have generally involved
circumstances- also not present her·e-where the declarant was not truly
unavailable. See id.; see also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (preliminary
hearing testhnony inadmissible where State did not seek presence); Motes v.
United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900) (witness unavailable due to negligence of
government); see also State v. Oniskor, 510 P.2d 929 (Utah 1973) (preliminary
hearing testimony inadmissible at trial where State had not proven
unavailability). See Point IB, supra.
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resulted in a hung jury. Id. at 251. By the time of his third trial, two of the
witnesses against him had died. Id. at 240. The trial court permitted those
witnesse·s' prior testimonies-in the form of reporter's notes-to be read at
Mattox's third trial. Id.

He was convicted and appealed, claiming that

admission of this prior testimony violated his confrontation rights. Id . .
In holding the testimony admissible, the Supreme Court noted that

"the authority in favor of the admissibility of such testimony, where the
defendant was present either at the examination of the deceased witness before

a committing magistrate, or upon a former trial of the same case, is
overwhelming." Id. at 242 (emphasis added). In support, the court favorably
cited more than a dozen lower court cases, including one in which "the
substance of a deceased witness' testimony given at a preliminary
examination was held to be admissible." Id. (citing United States v. Macomb,
5 McLean 286, Fed. Cas. No. 15,702).
The court explained that the "primary object" of the confrontation
clause was "to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits ... being used
against the prisoner in lieu of a personal exa1nina tion and cross-examination
of the witness," which was met by prior sworn testimony. Id. The court
understood that its holding would "deprive[]" a defendant "of the
advantage of that personal presence of the witness before the jury which the
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law has designed for his protection," but noted that the general rule "must
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities
of the case," and that letting the guilty walk free. because their accusers were
no longer available "would be carrying his constitutional protection to an
unwarrantable extent. The law, in its wisdom, declares that the rights of the
public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may
be preserved to the accused." Id. at 243. Thus, confrontation was satisfied
"in the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to face, and
subjecting him to the ordeal of cross-examination." Id. at 244 (emphasis
added). This was so even though the court upheld the exclusion of some
impeachment evidence against a deceased witness that had been discovered
after trial. Id. at 244-49.

Mattox's holding has been reaffirmed for more than 100 years.
Though its language was broad enough to include preliminary hearings, the
Supreme Court first addressed preliminary hearings specifically nearly fifty
years ago in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970).
In Green, a minor named Porter sold n1arijuana to an undercover
officer. 399 U.S. at 151. After Porter was arrested, he named Green as his
supplier. Id. Porter later testified for the State at Green's preliminary
hearing, where he was cross-examined by defense counsel. Id. At trial,
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Porter again testified, but became "markedly evasive and uncooperative,"
claiming that he had forgotten who his supplier was. Id. at 151-52 (citation
and quotation omitted). The court admitted Porter's preliminary hearing
testimony to impeach him. Id. at 152. The California Supreme Court held
that admitting Porter's preliminary hearing testimony violated Green's
confrontation rights. Id. at 153.
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The court acknowledged
that one virtue of having a witness testify at trial was that the jury could
"observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement," which
would aid "the jury in assessing his credibility." Id. at 158. But the court
cautioned that this direct observation was not the be-all and end-all of the
Confrontation Clause-while it "may be true that a jury would be in a better
position to evaluate the h·uth of the prior statement if it could somehow be
whisked magically back in time to witness" it, the Constitution did not
require that. Id. at 160-61.
Granted, Porter actually testified at Green's trial, and was subject to
cross-exa1nination on his prior statements. Id. at 161-62. But the Court's
holding was not limited to that circumstance-the Court explained that
"Porter's preliminary hearing testimony was admissible" under the
Confrontation Clause even if Porter had not testified at trial, because his
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preliminary hearing statement was "given under circumstances closely
approximating those that surround a typical trial," which included:
•

Porter was under oath;

•

Green was represented by counsel;

•

Green's counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine
Porter on his statements to police, without any significant
limitation; and

•

the proceedings were held in front of a judge.

Id. at 165-66. Under these circumstances, the preliminary hearing was not
"significantly different from an actual trial" for confrontation purposes, and
the preliminary hearing testimony would have been admissible even if
Porter had been unavailable to testify at trial. Id. (citing Mattox, 156 U.S.

257).

Green was decided before both Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and
Crawford, which set out the current confrontation requirements. But both
Roberts and Crawford show Green's continuing validity.
Roberts was charged with check forgery and possession of stolen
credit cards from a Bernard Isaacs. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58. One of the
witnesses for Roberts at the preliminary hearing was Anita IsaacsBernard's daughter-who let Roberts stay at her apartment.

Id.

Anita

denied giving Roberts permission to use her father's checks and credit
cards. Id. At trial, Roberts claimed that Anita had given him the financial
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instruments "with the understanding that he could use them." Id. at 59.
Anita was not available to testify at trial, so the State introduced her
preliminary hearing testimony to rebut Roberts' claim. Id.
Like the California court in Green, the Ohio Supreme Court in Roberts
held that prior preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible under the
Confrontation Clause because there was "little incentive to cross-examine a
witness at a preliminary hearing, where the ultimate issue is only probable
cause."

Id. at 61 (citation and quotation omitted). The Supreme Court

reversed and re-affirmed Green., explaining that the preliminary hearing
afforded an "adequate opportunity to cross-examine." Id. at 73 (citation
omitted).
True, the Roberts court also held that hearsay statements of an
unavailable declarant were admissible under the Confrontation Clause so
long as they bore "adequate indicia of reliability."
omitted).

Id. at 66 (quotation

And the Supreme Court later abandoned this test in Crawford in

favor of the two-element test of (1) unavailability and (2) prior opportunity
for cross-examination. 541 U.S. at 60. But Crawford itself noted that Roberts'
result likely survived, even if its test did not. Id. at 58 ("Even our recent
cases, in their outcomes, hew[ed] closely to the traditional line. [Roberts]
admitted testhnony from a preliminary hearing at which the defendant had
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cross-examined the witness."). And like Roberts, Cranford-re-affirmed Green
and Mattox. Id. at 57 (citing Green and Mattox for proposition that
"preliminary hearing testimony is admissible only if the defendant had an
adequate opportunity to cross-examine"). Further, the Supreme Court in

United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988), made clear that crossexamination need not even necessarily take place-the defendant need only
have the opportunity to cross-examine. Id. at 559.
This Court has repeatedly affirmed the admission of an unavailable
witness's preliminary hearing testimony, most recently last year. Mackin v.

State, 2016 UT 47, if if38-42, _ P.3d _; Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 402-03; State v.
Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913-14 (Utah 1988); State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 540-42
(Utah 1981).

In Brooks, four transients fought each other in the "hobo

jungle" over $14. Brooks, 638 P.2d at 538. Two of the men were charged
with aggravated assault, and the other two testified against them at a
preliminary hearing, where they were cross-examined. Id. When the victims
were later declared unavailable, their prior testimony came in at trial over
Brooks' s confrontation objection. Id.
This Court affirmed under the Roberts reliability test, which governed
confrontati~n clause questions at the time, but explained that the reliability
of the testimony sprang from a preliminary hearing, "with all its formalities
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Q

and protections." Id. at 540-41.

And it rejected Brooks' s argument that

preliminary hearings did not afford an adequate opportunity to crossexamine based on the limited nature of the hearing, explaining that the
defense's "motive and interest are the same" at both preliminary hearing
and trial- to establish the defendant's im1ocence. Id. at 541.
This Court also held prior preliminary hearing testimony admissible
in both Lovell, 758 P.2d at 913-14, and Menzies, 889 P.2d at 402-03, which
were decided under Roberts. And this Court most recently affirmed the
admission of prior preliminary hearing testimony under Crawford in Mackin,
2016 UT 47, ilif40-42.
The court of appeals has followed suit. See State v. Pham, 2016 UT
App 105, 372 P.3d 734, cert granted, 384 P.3d 567 (Sept. 12, 2016); West Valley

City v. Kent, 2016 UT App 8, 366 P.3d 415; Garrido, 2013 UT App 245. This
Court has approved this course. See Mackin, 2016 UT 47, if39 (holding that

Garrido is "[c]onsistent" with Crawford and Menzies).

And at least three

federal circuits and seven other states have similarly held preliminary
hearing testimony of an unavailable witness admissible under the
confrontation clause. See United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 445 (5th Cir.
2004); Glenn v. Dallman, 635 F.2d 1183, 1187 (6th Cir. 1980); United States ex

rel. Haywood v. Wolff, 658 F.2d 455, 459-60 (7th Cir. 1981); People v. Williams,
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181 P.3d 1035, 1061 (Cal.App.4th 2008); State v. Vinhaca, 205 P.3d 649 (Haw.
2009); State v. Young, 87 P.3d 308, 316-17 (Kan. 2004); State v. Aaron, 218
S.W.3d 501, 517 (Mo. App. 2007); Chavez v. State, 213 P.3d 476, 479 (Nev.
2009); State v. Henderson, 136 P.3d 1005, 1011 (N.M. App. 2006); Primeaux v.

State, 88 P.3d 893, 905-06 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004); see also United States v.
Williams, 116 Fed.Appx. 890, 891-92 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding deposition
testimony admissible under confrontation clause); Simmons v. State, 234
S.W.3d 321, 326 (Ark. App. 2006) (same); Yost, 749 N.W.2d at 774-75 (same).
2. Goins has shown no compelling reason to depart from
this long-established, and correct, precedent.

Notwithstanding this extensive authority, Goins asks this Court to
(-'\
~

reverse a century-old course and hold that preliminary hearings-due to
their limited purpose - are inadequate to afford a defendant

the

opportunity to cross-examine a witness. Pet.Br. 10-32. This Court should
decline to do so.

It is true that preliminary hearings take place early on in a case and
are generally limited to determining whether probable cause exists. Id. It is
also true that there is no right to confront witnesses at preliminary hearings,
and that the State may choose to present written statements in lieu of live
testimony. See Utah R. Evid. 1102; Timmerman, 2009 UT 58. But where the
State elects to present live testimony, defendants do have a rule-based right

-32-

to cross-examine. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(l). And magistrates have anabilityalbeit limited- to determine credibility. State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ,r24, 137
P.3d 787 ("Magistrates may make credibility determinations in preliminary
hearings, but the extent of those determinations is limited."). Where the
prior opportunity to challenge credibility exists, confrontation is satisfied.

See, e.g., State v. Stano, 159 P.3d 931, 945 (Kan. 2007) (holding no
confrontation violation from admission of preliminary hearing testimony
where defendants are not barred from cross-examining witnesses at
preliminary hearing on credibility); Chavez, 213 P.3d at 485 (similar).
Further, however limited a particular preliminary hearing may be, the
one here had those characteristics that the Green court held "closely
approximat[ed] those that surround a typical trial" -Estrada was under
oath; Goins was represented by counsel; defense counsel had the
opportunity to cross-examine Estrada without limitation; and the
proceedings were held in front of a judge. Goins, 2016 UT App 57, ,r16. See

Green, 399 U.S. at 165-66; see also Menzies, 889 P.2d 403 (holding preliminary
hearing testimony reliable where it was "given under oath before a judge
and Menzies was represented by counsel who had the opportunity to crossexamine" the witness).
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In arguing to the contrary, Goins relies largely on (1) the 1995
amendment of Utah Constitution, article I, section 12; and (2) People v. Fry,
92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004). Neither is persuasive.
After this Court decided Brooks, the Utah Constitution was amended
to make clear that the purpose of preliminary hearings was to determine
probable cause, and that reliable hearsay was admissible. See Pham, 2016
UT App 105, if17 n.3. This overturned this Court's decision in State v.

Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980), which held that there was a state
constitutional right to cross-examine at preliminary hearings.
But these changes did not affect the federal constitution nor the
aspects of preliminary hearings that the United States Supreme Court has
held ensure an adequate opportunity for cross-examination-a witness
under oath, a judge, defense counsel, and cross-examining without
significant limitation. Green, 399 U.S. at 165-66.
Goins also cites to People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004). Pet.Br. 27-29.
But Fry is unpersuasive. There, the Colorado Supreme Court held that
because preliminary hearings in that state are limited to probable cause
findings, they could not afford an adequate prior opportunity for crossexamination. Id. at 977. But as shown, the United States Supreme Court
rejected this very sort of reasoning as far back as Mattox and as recently as
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Green. And, again, whatever the limits of preliminary hearings generally,
the one here retained the characteristics that both the United States Supreme
Court and this Court have held most critical-an oath, a judge, a witness
able to be cross-examined without significant limitation, and a defendant
represented by counsel.
And, in Brooks, this Court explicitly rejected the very case on which
Fry relied- People v. Smith, 597 P.2d 204 (Colo. 1979). Fry cited Smith for the

proposition that "due to the limited nature of the preliminary hearing, the
opportun_ity

for

cross-examination was

Confrontation Clause." 92 P.3d at 977.

insufficient to

satisfy

the

Brooks directly rejected Smith's

reasoning, holding that defense counsel's "motive and interest are the
same" at both preliminary hearing and trial" and that "cross-examination
takes place" at both "under the same motive and interest." 638 P.2d at 541.

See also Henderson, 136 P.3d at 1010 (" At the preliminary hearing and trial,
Defendant was charged with the same crimes, he had the same defense
counsel, and the same opportunity and motive to cross-examine" the
witness); State v. Mohamed, 130 P.3d 401, 405 (Wash. App. 2006)
("Mohamed's interest at the pretrial hearing was the same as it would have
been at trial, and equally pressing: to establish [victim's] recantation as
credible and prove that her out of court statements were umeliable."). As

.-

"""
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the court of appeals noted here, the arguments rejected on this issue in

Brooks were identical to those raised by Goins in the court of appeals. Goins,
2016 UT App 57, ,r20.
Further, other courts have almost universally rejected Fn/ s reasoning.
Most of the courts addressing Fry have either distinguished it or outright
declined to follow it. This is because Fry's extre1ne outcome results in "a
blanket prohibition of preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable
witness" -which the "majority of courts do not condone." State v. Mantz,
222 P.3d 471, 477 (Idaho App. 2009); see, e.g., People v. Thompson, case no.
C058768, 2009 WL 4758792, *14 (Cal. App. 3d. Dec. 14, 2009) (refusing to
follow Fry)(unpublished); State v. Nofoa, 349 P.3d 327, 339-40 (Haw. 2015)
(refusin.g to follow Fry's "complete ban on prelhninary hearing" testimony
in favor of reviewing each decision on" case-by-case basis"); Stano, 159 P.3d
at 945 (refusing to follow Fry where defendants can cross-examine state
witnesses at preliminary hearings and have similar motives to trial); State v.

Aaron, 218 S.W.3d 501, 516 (Mo. App. 2007) (refusing to follow Fry despite
defendant's admittedly different "interest and motive in his crossexamination" at preliminary hearing); Chavez, 213 P.3d at 484-85 (refusing to
follow Fry); Henderson, 136 P.3d at 1010 (refusing to follow Fry and holding
that counsel had same motive and interest both at preliminary hearing and
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at trial); Mohamed, 130 P.3d at 402, 404-05 (refusing to follow Fry because
defendant had similar motive and prior opportunity to cross-examine); see

also O'Neal v. Province, 415 Fed.Appx. 921, 923-24 (10th Cir. 2011) (affirming
lower court because preliminary hearing afforded sufficient opportunity for
prior cross-examination); Parker v. Jones, 423 Fed.Appx. 824, 831-32 (10th
Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. Hargrove, 382 Fed.Appx. 765, 779 (10th Cir.
2010) (affirming lower court even "if defendant's cross-examination of
witness at the preliminary hearing was narrow in scope and would have
been conducted differently" if counsel knew the witness would be
unavailable at trial); Bowman v. Neal, 172 Fed.Appx. 819, 828-29 (10th Cir.
2006) (affirming lower court's admission of preliminary hearing testimony
even when limitations were placed on defense counsel's prior crossexamination).
Goins seeks to support his position by citing to State v. Stuart, 695
N.W.2d 259 (Wis. 2005). Pet.Br. 25. But Stuart did not support establishment
of a per se ban on using preliminary hearing testimony. It merely stated that
when a cross-examination is in fact restricted on credibility issues, a
confrontation problem could arise if the prosecution later tried to use that
testimony at trial.

Id.at 266.

That is not this case. Whatever potential
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limitations may be imposed by individual 1nagistrates in a given case, none
occurred here.
Goins also presses a number of policy arguments, none of them
persuasive. He alleges that if defense counsel were required to fully crossexamine at prelhninary hearings, "there may be little time left for judges to
conduct actual trials." Pet.Br. 29. He supports his assertion of procedural
mayhem by providing a compilation of felonies for which preliminary
hearings were scheduled in 2015. Pet. Br. at separately bound Appendix. He
then proceeds to provide his "best guess" and "conjecture" as to the
amount, in hours, of judicial time that would be dedicated to preliminary
hearings in which defense counsel took full advantage of the opportunity to
cross-examine every witness. Id. at 29-30. His compilation does not account
for a number of relevant factors- e.g., the number of preliminary hearings
waived in 2015 or already including cross-examination of all key
witnesses- and fails to consider the number of cases in which "every"
witness would truly need to be cross-examined. Id. Goins acknowledges
and excuses the potential inaccuracies in both the data and the estimates,
using the information simply to demonstrate the hnpracticality of crossexamining every witness in every preliminary hearing. Id. at 30.
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But, practically speaking, not every defense counsel would choose to
cross-examine every witness: they simply have the opportunity to do so.
And there remain witnesses for whon1 cross-examination should always
occur, e.g., those who are homeless, terminally ill, seriously mentally ill,
suicidal, drug-addicted, and active-duty military subject to combat
deployment.

Goins, 2016 UT App 57, ,I18, n7.

The fact remains, the

preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness has been
admissible at trial in Utah since Maddox, Green, or at very least, Brooks. The
intervening decades have not created unmanageable caseloads.
Goins' remaining concerns present no barrier to use of the
preliminary hearing testimony in appropriate circumstances. It has long
been certain that such testimony could be admissible if the declarant was
unavailable and the defendant had counsel and was able to cross-examine
the witness. To the extent a magistrate in another case might limit crossexamination, Pet.Br. 25-27, that did not happen here. In any event, an effort
by a magistrate to significantly limit cross-examination on credibility issues,
or by the State to present reliable hearsay in lieu of live testimony, see Utah
R. Evid. 1102, would present this Court with a much different case and

defense counsel with a 1nuch stronger argument for exclusion of the
testimony from trial.
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Further, a defense counsel's decision to curtail potentially beneficial
avenues of questioning for whatever reason, Pet.Br. 25, does not eliminate
the opportunity to cross-examine. See Garrido, 2013 UT App 245,

,r,r1s,

20

(Garrido's Sixth Amendment rights not violated by adn1ission of victim's
preliminary hearing testimony at trial because Garrido had requisite
opportunity for cross-examination at preliminary hearing, despite counsel's
decision to forego it).
Goins also asserts that later-discovered evidence often impacts crossexamination at trial, and that a preliminary hearing conducted before all
discovery is availab_le to the defense necessarily renders the prior
opportunity inadequate.

Pet.Br. 31.

But this Court rejected that very

contention in Menzies, 889 P.2d at 402-03, which Goins does not even cite.
Menzies's former cell mate, Walter Britton, testified at Menzies's
preliminary hearing that Menzies confessed to killing the victim. Id. at 401.
At trial, Britton became uncooperative and refused to testify, despite the
court holding him in contempt. Id. The trial court ruled Britton unavailable
and admitted his preliminary hearing testimony. Id. at 401-02.
On appeal, Menzies argued a confrontation violation, based in part on
his inability to cross-examine Britton using convictions that occurred
between preliminary hearing and h·ial. Id. at 403. This Court affirmed,
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explaining that while it "agree[ d] that new evidence obtained after the
hearing may have aided an attack on Brittan's credibility on crossexamination, the preliminary hearing transcript indicate[d] that the issue
was well-explored." Id.
Goins argues for the first time that application of Utah Constitution,
Art. I, section 12 and rule 804(a)(5), Utah Rules of Evidence, violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution and the Uniform
Operation of Laws provision of the state constitution. Pet.Br. 26-27. But in
the absence of any mention of exceptions to the preservation rule, this Court
should decline to entertain the claim. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, 113, 95
P.3d 276 (This Court generally "will not consider an issue, including
constitutional arguments, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial
court

committed

plain

error

or

the

case

involves

exceptional

circumstances"). 5
Goins's arguments ignore the fact that it is Goins-not the Statewho seeks_ to change the law. He has not met his heavy burden of
convincing this Court that a long line of authority sh·etching back more than
5

Alternatively, the issue fails for inadequate briefing because Goins
does not include any meaningful analysis, as required by rule 24, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (outline the
requirements of an adequate brief); State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, ,r22, 128 P.3d
1179.
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a century- and approved by this Court as recently as last October- has
become unworkable or was incorrectly decided in the first instance.

See

generally Menzies, 889 P.2d at 398-99. Preliminary hearing testimony of an
unavailable

declarant

should

remain

generally

admissible

absent

exceptional circumstances, such as where a magish·ate significantly limits
cross-examination on credibility issues.
Finally, there is an important policy reason to reject Goins's blanket
approach. In fairness to the State and victims, a defendant should not walk
free merely because a victim has become unavailable after being crossexamined at a preliminary hearing. As the Mattox court explained, "To say
that a criminal ... should go scot free simply because death has closed the
mouth of" the victim "would be carrying his constitutional protection to an
unwarrantable extent. The law, in its wisdom, declares that the rights of the
public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order than an incidental benefit may
be preserved to the accused." 156 U.S. at 243.
/-·\
\ljl

Those "incidental benefits" included "testing the recollection and
sifting the conscience of the witness" and "compelling him to stand face to
face with the jury in order that they may look at hhn, and judge his
demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony
whether he is worthy of belief." Id. at 242-43. Cf Green, 399 U.S. at 160
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(rejecting confrontation claim based on admission of preliminary hearing
testimony even though it "may be true that a jury would be in a better
position to evaluate the truth of the prior statements if it could somehow be
whisked magically back in time to witness a grueling cross-examination" at
the time of the statement).
Thus, the Supreme Court has struck a necessary balance and explicitly
recognized the need to consider fairness not only to a defendant, but to the
State and to victims. Fairness concerns are particularly acute in domestic
violence and gang cases, where it is lamentably common for victims to
become uncooperative-and thus unavailable-out of fear of the defendant,
a misplaced sense of love or loyalty, or some other factor outside the State's
control. See, e.g., Garrido, 2013 UT App 245,

,r,r4, 23-26 (discussing domestic

violence victim's lack of cooperation with prosecution stemming from fear).
Those same concerns support rejection of Goins's assertion of a blanket
prohibition on the use at trial of an unavailable witness's preliminary
hearing testimony.
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3. Admitting the unavailable victim's cross-examined
preliminary hearing testimony did not violate Goins's
confrontation right.

Applying the long-established precedent previously described to this
case, this Court should hold that Goins has not shown a violation of his
confrontation right.
Goins points to no defect in or limitation of the cross-examination that
took place at preliminary hearing. His cross-examination of the witness- a
known transient-was entirely unfettered.

Though he suggests that

discovery was not complete at the time of the preliminary hearing, Pet. Br.
22-23, he does not point to any evidence that later came to his attention that
he would have used had the victim appeared at trial. Thus, Goins has not
shown that the preliminary hearing in his case did not afford him an
adequate opportunity to cross-exa1nine the victim, and this Court should
affirm.
D. Any error in the court of appeals' decision concerning use of
Estrada's preliminary hearing testimony at trial would be
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Should this Court find that the use at h·ial of Estrada's preliminary
hearing testimony violated Goins' s confrontation rights, it should still
affirm his felony conviction because the error would be harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
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Goins urges reversal because Estrada's testimony was "vital" to the
State's case on both his felony and misdemeanor convictions. Pet.Br. 17-18.
Instead, any error would be prejudicial only as to Goins' class A
misdemeanor conviction for using a knife against Estrada. See Goins, 2016
UT App 57, ,r 6, n5. His was the only testimony offered with regard to the
misdemeanor charge, R167:5-6, requiring reversal if it were found to have
been erroneously admitted.
Estrada's testimony was not relevant to the felonious assault on
Omar.

His comments about Goins' possession of the knife and Goins'

attitude before finding Omar would have had little, if any, impact on the
conviction for assaulting Omar because: (1) Estrada did not witness the
assault; (2) Omar's vivid testimony was independently corroborated by an
eyewitness who watched almost the entirety of the altercation; and (3)
further corroboration derived from photographs depicting the significant
injuries inflicted on Omar and the minor scratches suffered by Goins. See id.
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II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY DENIED GOINS'S
REHEARING PETITION BASED ON RULE 35 AND
PRECEDENT FROM THIS COURT; REGARDLESS, THE
CLAIMS
DO
NOT
ESTABLISH
INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF GO INS'S PRIOR COUNSEL

Goins claims that the court of appeals erroneously denied his
rehearing petition in which, with the benefit of new appellate counsel, he
raised new claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. 6
Pet.Br. 33-39.

He contends that the clahns warranted consideration on

rehearing under rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, because prior
appellate counsel's failure to raise the claims caused the court of appeals to
11

overlook" them. Id. at 33-35. He further argues that the court should have

reached the merits of the claims because they could be reviewed and
decided on the existing appellate record. Id. at 34.
But a rehearing petition is not an appropriate vehicle for raising
claims for the first time on direct appeal. To permit Goins to do so would
exceed the scope of the rule's plain language and conflict with the longstanding decisions of this Court.

6

Goins appropriately limits this issue to the charges relating to Omar.
Pet.Br. 32.
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A. The court of appeals properly refused to hear a new claim
raised for the first time in a rehearing petition.

Rule 35(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a petition
for rehearing "shall state with particularity the points of law or fact ·which
the petitioner claims the court has overlooked or misapprehended" in
rendering its decision in a direct appeal. Utah R. App. P. 35(a).
Goins contends that he properly presented his new ineffectiveness
claims in a rehearing petition because his original appellate counsel's failure
to raise the claims in the direct appeal caused the court of appeals to
"overlook" the clahns. Pet.Br. 37. By this reasoning, a rehearing petition
would be an appropriate means to raise any claim not presented to the court
of appeals in the first instance.
The court of appeals properly rejected Goins's untimely attempt to
include new claims in his appeal for several reasons.

First, review of

Goins's claims is outside the scope of rehearing proceedings. The plain
language of the rule expressly permits rehearing in cases where the Court
"has overlooked or misapprehended" points of law or fact in rendering its
decision. Utah R. App. P. 35(a). This language focuses on the integrity and
consistency of this Court's decisions on the issues before it when it wrote
those decisions: a court cannot overlook or misapprehend a matter that was
never presented to it. Thus, denial of the rehearing petition was in keeping
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with the court of appeals' deference to this Court's rule-making authority.

See, e.g., State v. Parker, 936 P.2d 1118, 1122 (Utah App. 1997) (recognizing
supreme court's authority for drafting appellate rules and refusing to adopt
interpretation of appellate rule that exceeded the rule's plain language).
Second, the court of appeals' denial of the petition is consistent with
long-standing decisions from this Court holding that the rule does not
provide a vehicle for presentation of new claims. See Nebeker v. Summit

County, 2014 UT App 244, if 60, 338 P.3d 203 (refusing to consider challenge
raised for first time in rehearing petition); Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 P.2d
678, 681 (Utah 1982) (denying rehearing of new theory presented in
rehearing petition); Berg v. Otis Elevator Co., 64 Utah 518, 231 P. 832, 837-38
(1924) (refusing to consider new issue in rehearing petition that appellant
did not previously raise); Swanson v. Sims, 51 Utah 485, 498, 170 P. 774, 778
(1918) (same); Brown v. Pickard, 4 Utah 292, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886) (rehearing
will not be granted unless the court failed to consider some material point,
erred in its conclusions, or is presented with a material discovery which was
unknown when the case was argued). Cf Met v. State, 2016 UT 51, if 63 n.16,
_

P.3d _

(refusing to consider new argument raised in 24G) letter).

Third, none of Goins' s policy arguments justifies an exception to the
rule. Despite his statements to the contrary, Goins's new claims are neither
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"timely" nor "ripe." Pet.Br. 36-37. His new claims are not "thnely" raised if
they may not, by rule, be raised in a rehearing petition. The fact that the
petition itself was timely-filed provides no justification for review of matters
outside the scope of rule 35.
Goins's belief that his claims are "still ripe" overlooks the fact that
they will remain "ripe" when pursued by the "more familiar method" for
reviewing such claims: post-conviction review under the Post-Conviction
Remedies Act ["PCRA"]. See Order (citing Gregg v. State, 2012 UT 32, 279
P.3d 396, and Landry v. State, 2012 UT App 350, 293 P.3d 1092). The PCRA
expressly provides that "a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that
the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the
failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel."
Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-106(3) (West Supp. 2015). This exception would
allow Goins to avoid the procedural bar of the PCRA and obtain postconviction review of his new claims by demonstrating his claim of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93, if45,
293 P.3d 345. The fact that Goins would have to hire counsel, proceed prose,
or seek counsel willing to present his case pro bona is not unique to Goins
but is of concern to every defendant pursuing this method of review.
Goins' s appeal to fairness, judicial economy and efficiency does not
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bring his claims within the procedural framework by which this Court has
decided such matters may be pursued. Pet.Br. 37. Especially where, as here,
the claims lack merit, it is hard to see that either justice or judicial economy
will be served by dictating that the court of appeals should have ignored
rule 35 and granted review of the claims on rehearing.
Further, there is no fair comparison of Goins's attempt to present a
new, untimely ineffectiveness claim with use of a rule 23B remand to
present a timely ineffectiveness claim: the latter is expressly provided for by
appellate rule while the former is not. Pet. Br. 38-39.
Finally, this Court's decision in State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029
(Utah 1991), does not establish error in the court of appeals' denial of
Goins' s rehearing petition.

Pet. Br. 38.

Humphries involved this Court's

decision to provide discretionary review of a new claim of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel in the context of a petition for writ of
certiorari. 818 P.2d at 1029. It did not speak to the court of appeals' exercise
of its discretionary review under rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
In any event, rule 35 does not provide for presentation and review
new claims, and the court of appeals did not err in so interpreting the rule
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in this case. As there was no error in the denial of the rehearing petition,

further review unnecessary.
B. This Court should refuse to review the new claim on certiorari.

Should this Court accept Goins' s invitation to reach the merits of his
new claims for the first time on certiorari review, there is ·precedent to do so.

See State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1991), abrogated on other grounds
in State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92.

In Humphries, this Court

granted certiorari to review a new claim of prosecutorial misconduct and
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel for failing to raise the
error. Id. at 1028-30. The Court held that review was appropriate because
the new claims were "raised in a second tier of appellate review by new
appellate counsel," and the record and briefs included all evidence and
argument which might be made on the matter. Id. at 1029.
This Court may, in its discretion, undertake such a review. See Utah
R. App. P. 46(a). But it should not do so because this case is distinguishable

from Humphries and is not entitled to the same consideration. In Humphries,
the State candidly acknowledged the existence of reversible error that the
State was willing to concede in a post-conviction proceeding, justifying
circumvention of the usual procedure for remedying the new claim. 818
P.2d at 1029. Here, there is no reversible error (see argument, infra), and the
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procedure for addressing Goins' s new claims should be no different ·than
the established procedure applied to all other claims raised following
issuance of a decision on direct appeal.
C. In any event, Goins's new claims do not establish ineffective
assistance.

In the end, this Court's review is unwarranted because trial counsel's
performance was not deficient, and if it was, it was not prejudicial and,
hence, would not have resulted in reversal had appellate counsel raised the
claim on appeal. See Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, if211, 344 P.3d 581
(ineffectiveness of appellate counsel for not raising a claim requires proof of
"a genuine issue of material fact" regarding whether appellate counsel
overlooked an issue which is obvious from the h ial record and ... which
4

probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal").
Ineffective assistance requires a defendant to prove both (1) deficient
performance and (2) prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688,
694 (1984). Proving the deficient performance element requires a defendant
to overcome the "strong presumption" that counsel acted reasonably. Id. at
689. This presumption is overcome only where a defendant can show that
no reasonable attorney would have done what counsel did. See, e.g., State v.

Curtis, 2013 UT App 287, if35, 317 P.3d 968 (holding no deficient
r:',

'lil>I

performance for not introd1:-7-cing evidence where record did not show that
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"no reasonable attorney would have failed to introduce it into evidence").
Further, deficient performance must be

II

a demonstrable reality," not a

"speculative matter." State v. Munguia, 2011 UT 5, iJ30, 253 P.3d 1082. This
II

Court must presume that any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is
supported by all the relevant evidence of which defendant is aware, and
any inadequacies, "ambiguities, or deficiencies" in the record regarding
counsel's performance are "simply ... construed in favor of a finding that
counsel performed effectively." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, iJ17.
The challenged jury instruction was proffered by defense counsel
below and provided:
You are instructed that the laws of Utah do not require a
defendant to establish self-defense by a preponderance or
greater weight of the evidence. The laws of Utah require the
defendant to bring forward some evidence which tends to show selfdefense. If the defendant has done this, and if such evidence of selfdefense, when considered in connection with all other evidence
in this case, raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt
then you must find him not guilty.
The defendant has no particular burden of proof but is
entitled to an acquittal if there is any basis in the evidence from
either side sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.
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R102 (emphasis added) (in Addendum D) Oury instr. 24). 7 Goins argues
that the instruction erroneously informs the jury that he is "solely"
responsible to "bring forward some evidence which tends to show selfdefense." Pet.Br. 41, 43-44. He explains that the case law instead permits
either party to present such evidence. Id. at 40-42. This error, he claims,
permitted the jury to determine that because the State, not Goins, brought
forward the evidence showing self-defense "in the first instance," the
affirmative defense was inapplicable. Id. at 42-43.
The instruction accurately sets out the parties' respective burdens of
proof relative to the affirmative defense except in one sentence which
requires defendant to bring forward smne supporting evidence.

R102.

Goins correctly observes that the initial evidence triggering a self-defense
claim may come from either party. See State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 934
(Utah App. 1991) (addressing similarly-worded instruction, noting the
evidence may be "introduced by defense or prosecution"), overruled on other

grounds in State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993).

This fact alone,

however, does not establish that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
7

Goins inadvertently recites his own proposed jury insh uction
instead of the instruction given by the trial court and thereafter states that
the trial court used that instruction. Pet.Br. 29, 41. The trial court altered
the proposed instruction by eliminating part of it and thereafter used the
altered instruction. Compare R60 with R102.
4
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Review begins with the "strong presumption" that counsel acted
reasonably. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. To defeat the presumption, Goins
must show that no reasonable attorney would have done what counsel did.

See, e.g., Curtis, 2013 UT App 287, if 35. He cannot do so on this record.
When counsel submitted the instruction, trial was approaching,
counsel had identified the potential witnesses, and she had every reason to
fully anticipate offering evidence on which to pursue the planned
affirmative defense. R35-70. She clearly knew that self-defense evidence
was a prerequisite to advancing the planned defense, and she knew that she
needed to paint Omar as the aggressor at the beginning of his interaction
with Goins, show that Omar put Goins in a position where the only means
of self-defense he had was to bite Omar, then elaborate not only on Omar's
combative state of mind but on his escalated impulse to "make Desean
bleed, too." R202:27-30; R168:41-44. Having been through the preliminary
hearing and seen a snapshot of the State's case, defense counsel's
anticipation of the need to introduce, elaborate on, or highlight the evidence
necessary for the self-defense claim would be entirely reasonable. Where
counsel reasonably expected to adduce at least some of the necessary
evidence at trial, her inclusion of the challenged sentence in her proposed
jury instruction was not umeasonable. Counsel thereafter produced such
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evidence at trial, reasonably refusing to rest on the prosecutor's direct
examination of the witnesses. Counsel's actions are entirely reasonable,
and, under these circumstances, it cannot be said that no reasonable
attorney would have included the challenged sentence in the jury
instruction.
Even when instructions are "ilnproper, confusing, or have the
potential to mislead the jury," the defendant claiming ineffective assistance
1nust still show prejudice- a reasonable likelihood of a different result
absent the error. State v. Nelson, 2015 UT 62, ~42, 355 P.3d 1031. Goins' s
ineffectiveness claims fail because he fails to present a prejudice argument.
He shnply restates the standards for establishing prejudice for his trial and
appellate claims, but presents no analysis regarding why, absent his trial
counsel's actions, there is a reasonable likelihood of a different result.
Pet.Br. 46-47. See Menzies, 2014 UT 40, ~152.
In any case, Goins cannot make this showing because the challenged
sentence in jury instruction 24 was not prejudicial where Goins actually
adduced vital parts of the self-defense evidence. See id. at 934-35. See also

Haston, 811 P.2d at 934 (finding similarly-worded instruction harmless
because Haston adduced part of the affirmative defense evidence).
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The jury was told that Goins needed to "bring forward some evidence
which tends to show self-defense.'! R102. They were not instructed that he
was "solely" responsible for adducing such evidence or that he needed to
"bring forward" the evidence "in the first instance," as Goins claims.
Pet.Br. 41, 43-44. Neither were they told that Goins had any burden to
establish that the evidence proved self-defense. R102.
Goins did exactly as the instruction purported to require- adduced
evidence tending to show self-defense. For example, the State called Omar
as its first witness and established that he was the first to 1nake physical
contact when he pushed Goins for stepping on his blanket and that he
thereafter sought to hurt Goins when he saw his own blood after losing his
earlobe. R167:125-31.
Defense counsel added to this evidence in cross and re-cross
examination of Omar, introducing Omar's preliminary hearing testimony
and defense-favorable phraseology. See, e.g., R167:143 (Omar's prior
testimony that he was already "pissed" at Goins before he touched the
blanket);_ R167:140-41 (Omar's prior admission that when he saw his own
blood, he "went crazy again," wanting "to try to make things even" and "to
make [Goins] bleed, too"); R167:140-45 (On1ar' s prior explanation that he
not only tried to make Goins bleed, but then chased him while trying to
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punch him). The misstatement in instruction 24 is unlikely to prompt the
jury to ignore defense counsel's efforts and reject his self-defense claim
either because Goins did not "bring forward s01ne evidence" of self-defense
or because he did not do so before the State did. See Haston, 811 P.2d at 934.
Neither is the 1nisstate1nent · likely to have affected the jury's
perception of the ultimate burden of proof. See Pet.Br. 43 (stating the
instruction gave the State a "free pass in its burden to prove the defendant

guilty"). This Court views the instructions as a whole to determine if they
"fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case," and can affirm
even where "one of the instructions, standing alone is not as accurate as it
might have been." State v. Maama, 2015 UT App 235, ,r1s, 359 P.3d 1272
(quotation, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Haston,
811 P.2d at 934.
Here, instruction 24 expressly and accurately stated that Goins was
not required to establish self-defense "by a preponderance or greater weight
of the evidence." R102. The same instruction also explained that the jury
must acquit Goins if there was "any basis in the evidence from either side
sufficient to cre~te a reasonable doubt." Id. Instruction 25 expressly stated
that it was "the prosecution's burden to prove that the defendant did not act
in self-defense" and that it must do so "beyond a reasonable doubt" R103.
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Each of the relevant elements instructions also directed that the State must
prove all elements, including that "Goins did not act in self-defense,"
beyond a reasonable doubt. R91, 92, 97 Oury instr. 13, 14, 19). And both
parties correctly argued in closing that the State bore the burden of proving
· that Goins did not act in self-defense. R168:33-34, 43-44.
Under these circumstances, Goins cannot establish the requisite
prejudice for his claim that trial counsel was ineffective - a reasonable
likelihood of a different result absent the misstate1nent in instruction 24. See

Nelson, 2015 UT 62, ~42 (even when instructions are "improper, confusing,
or have the potential to mislead the jury," a defendant claiming ineffective
assistance must still show prejudice). Therefore, his claim that appellate
counsel was ineffective necessarily fails.

See Menzies, 2014 UT 40., if211

(appellate counsel is ineffective for not raising a claim only if "a genuine
issue of material fact" exists regarding whether appellate counsel
overlooked an issue which is obvious from the trial record and ... which
probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal").
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals and its denial of Goins's rehearing petition.
Respectfully submitted on January 6, 2017.
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ORME, Judge:

1. Judge James Z. Davis began his work on this case as a member

of the Utah Court of Appeals. He retired from the court, but
thereafter became a Senior Judge. He completed his work on this
case sitting by special assignment as authorized by law. See
generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(6). Judge Davis, a member
of this court from 1993 until late in 2015 when he became a
senior judge, passed away on February 27, 2016. Judge Davis
was twice our presiding judge and three times our
representative on the Judicial Council. More importantly, he was
an esteemed colleague and good friend. His wit, wisdom, and
dedication will be sorely missed.

2 4 2016

State v. Goins

Cjfl
Desean Michael Goins (Defendant) was convicted of
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, see Utah Code Arm.
§ 76-5-103 (LexisNexis Supp. 2015), and threatening with or
using a dangerous weapon in a fight, a class A misdemeanor, see
id. § 76-10-506. 2 Defendant now appeals both convictions,
arguing that the trial court erroneously found that a witness was
unavailable and allowed the witness's prior testimony to be used
against Defendant on that basis. Because there was no error in
the trial court's determination of unavailability, and because
Defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness
when he gave his prior testimony, we affirm.

BACKGROUND
Cjf2
One morning in July 2013, Defendant and his girlfriend
set off on a search in downtown Salt Lake City with a very
specific goal: to find a homeless man (Witness) whom Defendant
believed had stolen his cell phone. They found Wih1ess outside a
homeless shelter for men. With knife in hand, Defendant
confronted Witness, who denied taking the phone and hurried
away.

13

The couple then made their way to Pioneer Park, a
traditional haunt of Salt Lake's homeless denizens, where one of
Witness's friends (Victim), also a homeless man, was sleeping on
his blanket. Defendant's girlfriend woke Victim and asked if he
had seen Witness. Defendant, waving the knife he still carried,
complained that Witness had stolen his phone. When Defendant
2. Although some of the statutes cited in this opinion have been
amended since July 2013, when the incident giving rise to the

charges against Defendant occurred, the amendments do not
affect our analysis. Accordingly, for ease of reference we cite the
most recent codification of the statutes.
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encroached on Victim's personal space, Victim pushed
Defendant off the blanket. An altercation ensued, during which
Defendant bit off Victim's earlobe. Both men stood up and
squared off once again, and Defendant then retrieved his knife,
which he had dropped during the scuffle, and stabbed Victim
under the left arm. Soon thereafter, police arrived and arrested
Defendant. Defendant was later charged in connection with the
assault of Victim and the brandishing of the knife against
Witness. 3
14
Prior to the preliminary hearing, the prosecution asked
Salt Lake City police bike patrols to locate Victim and Witness.
The officers were able to locate both men, who spent much of
their time together, "based primarily on a description of
[Victim's] missing earlobe," even though they did not have a
description of Wih1ess. Victim and Witness arrived together at
the preliminary hearing with a pastor from a church both men
regularly visited. The prosecution seized the opportunity to keep
more regular contact with both men through the pastor, 4 a man
who had the trust of both Witness and Victim.

3. Defendant was also charged with-and acquitted of-the
felony of mayhem, nearly forgotten outside the confines of firstyear Criminal Law in law school. See Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-105
(LexisNexis 2012) ("Every person who unlawfully and
intentionally deprives a human being of a member of his body,
or disables or renders it useless, or who cuts out or disables the
tongue, puts out an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of
mayhem."). Despite the rarity of mayhem convictions in modern
times, they are not unheard of. See, e.g., State v. Fairclough, 44
P.2d 692, 692-93 (Utah 1935) (affirming conviction for mayhem).
4. By the time of the trial, the pastor had left the state for a new
position. Because both the pastor and his successor affirmed that
service was made on both Witness and Victim, and because the
(continued ... )
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15

The prosecution regularly followed up with the pastor
and emailed him the trial information for him to pass along to
Wih1ess and Victim. The pastor verified that the two men
received the notification. A few weeks before trial, the pastor
informed the prosecution that Witness had gotten into some
trouble, been jailed, and fallen out with Victim. After receiving
this information, the prosecutor contacted the jail, but Witness
had already been released. From that time forth, neither Victim
nor the pastor, both of whom knew Witness well and could
recognize him by sight, saw or heard from Witness, and no one
saw Witness with his former friends or in his former hang-outs.
On the eve of trial, the prosecution contacted the jail to see if
Witness was incarcerated again, but he was not.
<j[6
Trial was scheduled to begin on October 23, 2013, but was
continued one day because no jury had been called for that date.
At that time, the prosecution asked the trial court to declare
Witness unavailable because Witness did not appear for trial and
the prosecution was unable to locate him. The prosecution also
asked the trial court to admit Witness's preliminary hearing
testimony during the trial. Over an objection raised by
Defendant's counsel that Witness "was not 'unavailable,"' the
trial court granted the motion and indicated that it would allow
the preliminary hearing testimony at the rescheduled trial. At
trial, which began the following day, the jury convicted
Defendant of aggravated assault, for the attack on Victim, and of
threatening with a dangerous weapon during a fight, for his
confrontation of Witness. Defendant appeals, and we affirm. 5
(... continued)
prosecution utilized the second pastor in the same manner as the
first, we use "the pastor" when referring to either of the two
pastors.
5. Although Defendant apparently appeals both the conviction
related to the assault of Victim and the one for brandishing the
(continued ... )
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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
17
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding
Wih1ess to be unavailable under rule 804 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence and in permitting Witness's preliminary hearing
testimony to be admitted under that rule as prior testimony.
"We review the district court's evidentiary rulings under an
abuse of discretion standard. However, error in the district
court's evidentiary rulings will result in reversal only if the error
is harmful." Anderson v. Larry H. Miller Commc'ns Corp., 2015 UT
App 134, 'Il 17, 351 P.3d 832 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). "The district court's decision to admit testimony
that may implicate the confrontation clause is also a question of
law reviewed for correctness." State v. Poole, 2010 UT 25, 'Il 8, 232
P.3d 519.

ANALYSIS
We note, preliminarily, that a statement is hearsay if
(1) the witness made the statement outside of the current trial or
hearing and (2) a party offers the statement "to prove the truth
of the matter asserted in the statement." Utah R. Evid. 801(c)(l)(2). Hearsay is inadmissible, unless an exception applies. See id.
R. 802. It is the interpretation and application of one such
<JIB

,-:::!\

Vi1JI

(... continued)
knife against Witness, we agree with the State that Witness's
testimony was relevant only to the charge relating to Witness.
Witness was not a witness to the assault of Victim and offered no
testimony on that point at the preliminary hearing; therefore,
even were we to discern an error in the presentation of Witness's
preliminary hearing testimony to the jury-which we do not, see
infra 'Ili 12-15, 18-20-we would still affirm Defendant's assault
conviction because the alleged error would be harmless as to
that charge.
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exception-the admission of prior testimony by an unavailable
potential witness-that we address in this opinion. See id. R.
804(b)(l).

I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding That
Wih1ess Was Unavailable.
CJ[9
Utah law requires that the party offering evidence in the
form of witness testimony make reasonable efforts to procure the
witness's testimony at trial. Id. R. 804(a)(5). "[C]onstitutional
unavailability is found only when it is 'practically impossible to
produce the witness in court.' ... [E]very reasonable effort must
be made to produce the witness. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393,
402 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted).
11

110

But "[a] good faith search does not mean that every lead,
no matter how nebulous, must be tracked to the ends of the
earth." Poe v. Turner, 490 F.2d 329, 331 (10th Cir. 1974)
(determining that the prosecution was under no obligation to
investigate vague claims that one prosecution witness had
11
moved to somewhere in the state of New York" and that
another "was said to have applied for employment with the
Santa Fe Railway in the 'midwest"'). In essence, although a party
must make every reasonable effort to procure the in-court
testimony of the witnesses that the party wishes to use, the party
is not, as the State puts it, required to do "everything humanly
possible" to do so. Thus, "Rule 804(a)(S) does not require a
patently futile attempt to serve a subpoena on a potential
witness ... whose physical location and address are completely
unknown." Brown. v. Harry Heathman, Inc., 744 P.2d 1016, 1018
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). See also State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 645-46
(Utah 1995) (holding that State's efforts to locate witness were
reasonable where it contacted United States Marshal's Office,
which had an outstanding warrant for arrest of witness, and
where federal officials "could not provide any concrete
information as to his present location, other than that he might
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be found in Mexico or southern California"), abrogated by statute
on. other grounds as recognized by Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73,
1 70, 267 P.3d 232.
111 In State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), we
concluded that the prosecutor's efforts to obtain two wih1esses'
testimony were reasonable. In that case, the prosecution
subpoenaed the wih1esses three times before trial; spoke with
and was assured of the presence of one witness at trial by that
witness's mother; visited the last known address of the other
witness, but discovered that the wih1ess had moved without
leaving a forwarding address; questioned police informants; and
searched police files for evidence of the whereabouts of the
missing witness. Id. at 893. Under such circumstances, we held
that the prosecution's "efforts compl[ied] with the hearsay
exception unavailability requirements." Id. On the other hand, in
State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme
Court concluded that the prosecutor's efforts to locate a witness
were unreasonable and the witness was not unavailable "where
efforts to secure the witness's attendance [were] cursory, where
the party had clear indications that the witness would not attend
or where the party had obvious means of obtaining those
indications but neglected to do so." Id. at 1122. See also id. at
1124-25 (affirming the district court, nonetheless, because the
district court's improper admission of the testimony was
harmless error).
112 The instant case is much more like the events in Drawn
than those discussed in Chapman. As in Drawn, but unlike in
Chapman, the prosecution in this case went to considerable effort
to obtain Witness's testimony at trial. Prior to the preliminary
hearing, the prosecution sent out police bike patrols to locate
Victim and Witness, and the officers located both men, even
though they were part of Salt Lake City's large homeless
population, based mostly on Victim's unfortunate lack of one
earlobe. There was nothing as distinctive in Wih1ess's
appearance, but luckily for the prosecution, Witness was often in

20140009-CA

7

2016 UT App 57

State v. Goins
the company of Victim. The two were homeless, presenting
obvious challenges to staying in touch, but when Victim and
Witness arrived together at the preliminary hearing with the
pastor, whom both men trusted, the prosecution seized upon the
opporhmity to use the pastor as a vehicle for staying in more
regular contact with both men. The prosecution followed up
regularly with the pastor and emailed him Defendant's trial
information. And the pastor verified that the two men
personally received this notification.
A few weeks before trial, however, the pastor informed
the prosecution that Witness had gotten in some trouble, been
jailed, and fallen out with Victim. After receiving this
information, the prosecutor contacted the jail, but Wib1ess had
already been released. From that time forward, neither Victim
nor the pastor saw or heard from Witness, and Witness was no
longer found with his former friends or in his former haunts. It is
far from clear that he even remained in Utah. 6 Thus, although
the prosecution did not re-enlist the police bike patrols to locate
Witness, it did not need to. It had no idea where to send the
<j{13

6. Research shows that not only are homeless people
more mobile than the population at large but that a
significant percentage of homeless individuals engage in
interstate migration, Peter H. Rossi, Down and Out in
America: The Origins of Homelessness 126 (The University of
Chicago Press 1989). See also Jennifer Amanda Jones,

Problems Migrate: Lessons from San Francisco's Homeless Population
Nonprofit Quarterly (June 26, 2013), available ath ttp://nonprofi tquarterly .org/2013/06/26/pro blems-migra telessons-from-san-francisco-s-homeless-population-survey/
[https://perma.cc/JHE8-7QS2] C' Almost 40% of San Francisco's
homeless population became homeless in a city other than San
Francisco. Most (24 %) hail from California, but many (15%) from
around the United States.").
Survey,
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patrols, and the police would have been unlikely to recognize
Witness when not in the presence of Victim. Realistically, the
pastor and Victim were more likely to spot Witness than were
randomly dispatched bike patrols. Additionally, on the eve of
trial, the prosecution also contacted the jail to see if Witness
might once again be incarcerated. They learned he was not.
1114 Whether the prosecution "could have done more to
ensure . . . [Witness] showed up for the trial" is not the issue;
instead, we consider whether the prosecution's efforts were
reasonable. As the State noted, "[a] good faith search does not
mean that every lead, no matter how nebulous, must be tracked
to the ends of the earth," Poe v. Turner, 490 F.2d 329, 331 (10th
Cir. 1974), and we conclude that the State acted reasonably even
though "[Witness] could [neither] be located nor produced in
court," Drawn, 791 P.2d at 894.
115 Indeed, the instant case is, in our estimation, an even
stronger case for affirmance than Drawn because here Defendant
acquiesced in both the method of keeping tabs on Witness and in
the means of serving him notice of the trial. First, the prosecution
told the magistrate at the preliminary hearing that the pastor
was the best way to stay in contact with Witness. If Defendant
had an objection to this method of communication as a substitute
for more formal service, unusual though it may have been, the
time to contest it was not at trial but at the preliminary hearing
when it was first proposed. Where "there is 'apparent[] if not
complete acquiescence [in] what the court did as a matter of
procedure,' '[n]either party is in a position to complain as to
[that] procedure' on appeal." Brown v. Babbitt, 2015 UT App 291,
114 n.9, 364 P.3d 60 (alterations in original) (quoting Hodges v.
Smoot, 125 P.2d 419, 421 (Utah 1942)). Second, Defendant
explicitly accepted the prosecution's proffer of its efforts to get
Witness to appear. For example, although Defendant faults the
trial court for "not even attempt[ing] to get testimony from the
pastor regarding the service to [Wih1ess ]," in doing so he ignores
the fact that the trial court offered him the opportunity to get
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such testimony from the pastor-an opportunity that he
declined. Because the prosecution made reasonable efforts to
locate Witness, though perhaps not all efforts "humanly
possible," we agree with the trial court that the prosecution
acted in good faith, and we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in finding Witness to be unavailable for
purposes of rule 804.
II. Witness's Testimony Was Properly Admitted Under Rule 804.

Cfil6 If the potential witness is unavailable, prior testimony
may be admitted if the witness gave the testimony "as a wih1ess
at a ... hearing," Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(l)(A), and the testimony is
"offered against a party who had ... an opportunity and similar
motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination,"
id. R. 804(b)(l)(B). Because a preliminary hearing is a "hearing"
under rule 804(b)(l)(A), the introduction of preliminary hearing
testimony may be allowed in lieu of the in-court testimony of the
witness if the court finds the potential witness to be unavailable:
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah 1981). Rule 804(b)(l)(B)
essentially incorporates the requirements of the Confrontation
Clause of the United States Constitution. See Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004) (holding that the
Confrontation Clause does not "allow[] admission of testimonial
statements of a wih1ess who [does] not appear at trial unless he
[is] unavailable to testify, and the defendant ha[s] had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination"). It is instructive that in
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), the United States Supreme
Court concluded that if a witness is unavailable, preliminary
hearing testimony is admissible under the Confrontation Clause
because the circumstances of a preliminary hearing
closely approximat[e] those that surround the
typical trial. [The wih1ess is put] under oath;
respondent [i]s represented by counsel . . . ;
respondent ha[s] every opportunity to crossexamine [the witness] as to his statement; and the
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proceedings [a]re conducted before a judicial
tribunal, equipped to provide a judicial record of
the hearings.

Id. at 165. The Court determined that, under such circumstances,
a party opposing introduction of preliminary hearing testimony
"had an effective opportunity for confrontation." Id.
Regarding the requirement that a party be given "an
opportunity" to develop the testimony of the witness, Utah R.
Evid. 804(b)(l)(B), the rule refers to the opportunity to examine
the witness, not to whether the defendant actually availed
himself of that opportunity, State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245,
<j[ 18, 314 P.3d 1014. The opportunity for cross-examination
"satisfie[s] the requirements of [the Constitution and the Rules of
Evidence]." Id. <j[ 20. This principle is well-established in Utah
law, predating even the codification of the Rules of Evidence.
See, e.g., State v. King, 68 P. 418, 419 (Utah 1902) ("By taking the
testimony of the witness ... in the presence of the accused upon
the examination at a time when he had the privilege of crossexamination, this constitutional privilege is satisfied, provided
the witness cannot, with due diligence, be found . . . . The
constitutional requirement of confrontation is not violated by
dispensing with the actual presence of the witness at the trial,
after he has already been subjected to cross-examination by the
accused[.]").

<j[17

<j[18 During the preliminary hearing, Defendant had the
opportunity to cross-examine Witness; indeed, he admits as
much in his appellate brief. It is therefore irrelevant whether trial
counsel voluntarily elected to forgo some aspect of crossexamination due to counsel's strategy.7 Garrido, 2013 UT App
7. Defendant makes much of the fact that the prosecution knew

procuring Witness's testimony at trial would be more difficult
than in the typical case because Witness was a homeless person.
(continued ... )
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245, «JI 18. Indeed, forgoing or minimizing cross-examination at a

preliminary hearing is a common practice among the defense
bar. 8 But Defendant was not denied the opportunity to crossexamine Witness.
(... continued)
True enough. But like the prosecution, defense counsel knew
that Witness was homeless. Defense counsel was likewise aware
that the prosecution might have difficulty in securing the
testimony of Witness and Victim at trial. In such a context,·
defense counsel could have anticipated that Witness and/or
Victim might not be physically present at trial and that, if
deemed unavailable, their testimony would be read for the jury.
In the case of homelessness and similar circumstances-such as
where a potential witness is terminally ill, seriously mentally ill,
suicidal, a known drug addict, or an active-duty soldier who
may be called up for combat deployment -there is a distinct
possibility that the wih1ess may vanish or otherwise become
unavailable before trial. It may behoove defense counsel in such
cases to take full advantage of any opportunity to cross-examine
such wib1esses. Then, if the testimony is read at trial, counsel's
cross-examination is part of what will be read, and the jury will
have a less one-sided version of the wib1ess's testimony.
8. Justice Brennan, writing in dissent in California v. Gteen, 399
U.S. 149 (1970), the case in which the United States Supreme

Court recognized that preliminary hearing testimony may be
admissible under the prior testimony hearsay exception, id. at
165, articulated several reasons for this common practice, id. at
197 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He noted,
First ... the objective of [a preliminary] hearing is
to establish the presence or absence of probable
cause, not guilt or innocence proved beyond a
reasonable doubt; thus, if evidence suffices to
establish probable cause, defense counsel has little
reason at the preliminary hearing to show that it
(continued ... )
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<_II19 As noted previously, however, hearsay testimony is
admissible under the prior testimony exception if, and only if,
the party offering the evidence can show that the party opposing
the introduction of the evidence had both "opportunity and
similar motive to develop it." Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(1 )(B)
(emphasis added). To this end, Defendant, relying upon
persuasive authority only, attempts to convince this court that

(... continued)
does not conclusively establish guilt .... Second,
neither defense nor prosecution is eager before trial
to disclose its case by extensive examination at the
preliminary hearing; thorough questioning of a
prosecution witness by defense counsel may easily
amount to a grant of gratis discovery to the State.
Third, the schedules of neither court nor counsel
can easily accommodate lengthy preliminary
hearings. Fourth, even were the judge and lawyers
not concerned that the proceedings be brief, the
defense and prosecution have generally had
inadequate time before the hearing to prepare for
extensive examination. Finally, though counsel
were to engage in extensive questioning, a part of
its force would never reach the trial factfinder, who
would know the examination only second hand.
Id. See also Right of Confrontation: Substantive Use at Trial of Friot
Statements, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 108, 114 (1970) (characterizing as
"troubling" "the [Supreme] Court's use of . . . preliminary
hearing testimony" at trial, on the ground that it had been
subject to cross-examination," because "[g]enerally, there is little
motivation for comprehensive cross-examination at a
preliminary hearing"). Whatever the truth of these sentiments,
they are not reflected in Utah law, see supra <JI 18; therefore,
members of the defense bar might do well to heed our
suggestions in appropriate cases, see supra 1[ 18 note 7.
11
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when "[t]rial counsel ... initially questioned [Wih1ess], at the
preliminary hearing, ... she did not have [the] same motive as
she would have had at trial." Defendant further states that "[t]he
purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine probable cause,
not [to] prov[e] the cause beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the
cross-examination may not have been as thorough because they
are only focusing on the basis for the arrest." We are not
unsympathetic to this argument, but the Utah Supreme Court
expressly foreclosed it in State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981),
which is overlooked in Defendant's briefs on appeal.
Dismissing as meritless arguments identical to those raised
by Defendant in this case, our Supreme Court concluded in
Brooks that "counsel's motive and interest are the same in either
[the trial or preliminary hearing] setting; he acts in both
situations in the interest of and motivated by establishing the
innocence of his client. Therefore, cross-examination takes place
at preliminary hearing and at trial under the same motive and
interest." Id. at 541. Thus, adhering to the rationale of Brooks, we
determine that Defendant's challenge is unavailing, and we
affirm the decision of the trial court to admit Wih1ess' s
preliminary hearing testimony.
c_i[20

CONCLUSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
Witness's preliminary hearing testimony when it found that
Witness was unavailable to testify because, under the
circumstances, the State made reasonable efforts to procure the
testimony of Witness at trial. Because Defendant had an
appropriate opportunity to cross-examine Witness, Witness's
testimony from that hearing was admissible under rule 804.
Cjf21

1122

Affirmed.
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Addendum B

United States Code Annotated
Constitution of the United States

U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. VI-Jury trials
Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.

U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 12
West's Utah Code Annotated
Constitution of Utah
··im Article I. Declaration of Rights
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
· and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided
by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as
defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine
probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if
appropri~te discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1994, S.J.R. 6, § 1. adopted at election Nov. 8. 1994. eff. Jan. 1. 1995.

West's Utah Code Am1otated
State Court Rules
Title V. General Provisions
Rules App.Proc., Rule 35

RULE 35. PETITION FOR REHEARING
(a) Petition for rehearing permitted. A rehearing will not be granted in the
absence of a petition for rehearing. A petition for rehearing may be filed only in
cases in which the court has issued an opinion, memorandum decision, or per
curiam decision. No other petitions for rehearing will be considered.
(b) Time for filing. A petition for rehearing may be filed with the clerk
within 14 days after issuance of the opinion, memorandum decision, or per
curiam decision of the court, unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order.
(c) Contents of petition. The petition shall state with particularity the
points of law or fact which the petitioner claims the court has overlooked or
misapprehended and shall contain such argument in support of the petition as
the petitioner desires. Counsel for petitioner must certify that the petition is
presented in good faith and not for delay.
(d) Oral argument. Oral argument in support of the petition will not be
permitted.
(e) Response. No response to a petition for rehearing will be received
unless requested by the court. Any response shall be filed within 14 days after
the entry of the order requesting the response, unless otherwise ordered by the
court. A petition for rehearing will not be granted in the absence of a request for
a response.
(f) Form of petition. The petition shall be in a form prescribed by Rule

27 and shall include a copy of the decision to which it is directed.
(g) Number of copies to be filed and served. An original and 6 copies
shall be filed with the court. Two copies shall be served on counsel for each party
separately represented.

(h) Length. Except by order of the court, a petition for rehearing and any
response requested by the court shall not exceed 15 pages.
✓,,,

~

(i) Color of cover. The cover of a petition for rehearing shall be tan; that of
any response to a petition for rehearing filed by a party, white; and that of any
response filed by an amicus curiae, green. All brief covers shall be of heavy cover
stock. There shall be adequate contrast between the printing and the color of the
cover.

(j) Action by court if granted. If a petition for rehearing is granted, the
court may make a final disposition of the cause without reargument, or may
restore it to the calendar for reargument or resubmission, or 1nay make such
other orders as are deemed appropriate under the circumstances of the particular
case.

(k) Untimely or consecutive petitions. Petitions for rehearing that are not
timely presented under this rule and consecutive petitions for rehearing will not
be received by the clerk.
(1) Amicus curiae. An amicus curiae may not file a petition for rehearing
but may file a response to a petition if the court has requested a response under
subparagraph (e) of this rule.

Credits
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; April 1, 2004; June 1, 2010; November 1,
2014.]

,b)

West's Utah Code Annotated
YI/)

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 14

RULE 14. SUBPOENAS
(a) Subpoenas requiring the attendance of a witness or interpreter and
production or inspection of records, papers, or other objects.

(a)(l) A subpoena to require the attendance of a witness or interpreter before a
court, magistrate or grand jury in connection with a criminal investigation or
prosecution may be issued by the magistrate with whom an information is filed,
the prosecuting attorney on his or her own initiative or upon the direction of the
grand jury, or the court in which an information or indictment is to be tried. The
clerk of the court in which a case is pending shall issue in blank to the defendant,
without charge, as many signed subpoenas as the defendant may require. An
attorney admitted to practice in the court in which the action is pending may also
issue and sign a subpoena as an officer of the court.
(a)(2) A subpoena may command the person to whom it is directed to appear
and testify or to produce in court or to allow inspection of records, papers or
other objects, other than those records pertaining to a victim covered by
Subsection (b). The court may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance
would be unreasonable.
(a)(3) A subpoena may be served by any person over the age of 18 years who is
not a party. Service shall be made by delivering a copy of the subpoena to the
witness or interpreter personally and notifying the witness or interpreter of the
contents. A peace officer shall serve any subpoena delivered for service in the
peace officer's county.
(a)(4) Written return of service of a subpoena shall be made promptly to the court
and to the person requesting that the subpoena be served, stating the time ~nd
place of service and by whom service was made.
(a)(5) A subpoena may compel the attendance of a witness from anywhere in the
state.

(a)(6) When a person required as a witness is in custody within the state, the
court may order the officer having custody of the witness to bring the witness
before the court.
(a)(7) Failure to obey a subpoena without reasonable excuse may be deemed a
contempt of the court responsible for its issuance.
(a)(8) Whenever a material witness is about to leave the state, or is so ill or infirm
as to afford reasonable grounds for believing that the witness will be unable to
attend a trial or hearing, either party may, upon notice to the other, apply to the
court for an order that the witness be examined conditionally by deposition.
Attendance of the witness at the deposition may be compelled by subpoena. The
defendant shall be present at the deposition and the court shall make whatever
order is necessary to effect such attendance.

(b) Subpoenas for the production of records of victim.

(b)(l) No subpoena or court order compelling the production of medical, mental
health, school, or other non-public records pertaining to a victim shall be issued
by or at the request of the defendant unless the court finds after a hearing, upon
notice as provided below, that the defendant is entitled to production of the
records sought under applicable state and federal law.
(b)(2) The request for the subpoena or court order shall identify the records
sought with particularity and be reasonably limited as to subject matter.
(b)(3) The request for the subpoena or court order shall be filed with the court as
soon as practicable, but no later than 28 days before trial, or by such other time as
permitted by the court. The request and notice of any hearing shall be served on
counsel for the victim or victim's representative and on the prosecutor. Service
on an unrepresented victim shall be made on the prosecutor.
(b)(4) If the court makes the required findings under subsection (b)(l), it shall
issue a subpoena or order requiring the production of the records to the court.
The court shall then conduct an in camera review of the records and disclose to
the defense and prosecution only those portions that the defendant has
demonstrated a right to inspect.

(b)(S) The court may, in its discretion or upon motion of either party or the victim
or the victim's representative, issue any reasonable order to protect the privacy of
the victim or to limit dissemination of disclosed records.
(b)(6) For purposes of this rule, "victim" and "victim's representative" are used
as defined in Utah Code Am1. § 77-38-2(2).

(c) Applicability of Rule 45, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The provisions of Rule 45, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, shall govern the
content, issuance, and service of subpoenas to the extent that those provisions are
consistent with the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Credits
[Amended effective November 1, 1996; April 1, 2001; November 1, 2007;
November 1, 2015.]

West's Utah Code Annotated (West 2014)
Utah Rules of Evidence
RULE 804. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY--WHEN THE DECLARANT IS
UNAVAILABLE AS A WITNESS
(a) Criteria for Being Unavailable. A declarant is considered to be unavailable as a witness if
the declarant:

(1) is exempted from testifying about the subject matter of the declarant's statement
because the court rules that a privilege applies;
(2) refuses to testify about the subject matter despite a court order to do so;
(3) testifies to not remembering the subject matter;
( 4) cannot be present or testify at the trial or hearing because of death or a then-existing
infirmity, physical illness, or mental illness; or
(5) is absent from the trial or hearing and the statement's proponent has not been able, by
process or other reasonable means, to procure the declarant's attendance.
But this subdivision (a) does not apply if the statement's proponent procured or wrongfully
caused the declarant's unavailability as a witness in order to prevent the declarant from
attending or testifying.
·

(b) The Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay if the declarant
is unavailable as a witness:

(1) Former Testimony. Testimony that:
(A) was given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, whether given
during the current proceeding or a different one; and
(B) is now offered against a party who had--or, in a civil case, whose predecessor
in interest had--an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-,
or redirect examination.
(2) Statement Under the Belief of Imminent Death. In a civil or criminal case, a
statement made by the declarant while believing the declarant's death to be imminent, if
the judge finds it was made in good faith.
(3) Statement Against Interest. A statement that:
(A) a reasonable person in the declarant's position would have made only if the
person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to the
declarant's proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to
invalidate the declarant's claim against someone else or to expose the declarant
to civil or criminal liability; and
(B) is supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its
trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the
declarant to criminal liability.

(4) Statement of Personal or Family History. A statement about:
(A) the declarant's own birth, adoption, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce,
relationship by blood or marriage, or similar facts of personal or family history,
even though the declarant had no way of acquiring personal knowledge about that
fact; or
(B) another person concerning any of these facts, as well as death, if the
declarant was related to the person by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so
intimately associated with the person's family that the declarant's information is
likely to be accurate.

CREDIT(S)
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 2004; December 1, 2011.]
2011 ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
The language of this rule has been amended as part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to
make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the
rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in
any ruling on evidence admissibility.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
Subdivision (a) is comparable to Rule 63(7) [Rule 62(7) ], Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Rule
62(7)[ (e) ], Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), seems to be encompassed in Rule 804(a)(S).
Subdivision (a)(S) is a modification of the federal rule which permits judicial discretion to be
applied in determining unavailability of a witness.
Subdivision (b)(l) is comparable to Rule 63(3), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but the former
rule is broader to the extent that it did not limit the admission of the testimony to a situation
where the party to the action had the interest and opportunity to develop the testimony. Condas
v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980); State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981).
Subdivision (b)(2) is comparable to Rule 63(5), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but the former
rule was not limited to declarations concerning the cause or circumstances of the impending
death nor did it limit dying declarations in criminal prosecutions to homicide cases. The rule has
been modified by making it applicable to any civil or criminal proceeding, subject to the
qualification that the judge finds the statement to have been made in good faith.
Subdivision (b)(3) is comparable to Rule 63(10), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), though it does
not extend merely to social interests.
Subdivision (b)( 4) is similar to Rule 63(24), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (b)(S) [deleted in 2004] had no counterpart in Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
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1

begin with picking the jury tomorrow morning because we will

2

have been able to address all preliminary matters today,

3

okay?
What is the preliminary motion that you wish to

4

5

address at this time?

MR. LEAVITT:

6

Your Honor,

the preliminary motion is

7

this, Gabriel Estrada who is the listed victim in Count 3, we

8

have gone to some lengths to try to procure his attendance

9

here today Proffer those efforts for me, please.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. LEAVITT: And what those - as an offer of proof,

12

Your Honor, what those efforts were was about a month ago -

13

in order to procure his attendance at the preliminary

14

hearing, both of these witnesses in this case are homeless.

15

Their address is a shelter and so as the Court knows,

16

a very transient nature to that and it's sometimes hard to

17

locate people.

18

hearing what we did is we contacted the Salt Lake City Bike

19

Police and were able to find them mostly based on Jacob

20

Omar's appearance because as a result of this case he has a

21

missing earlobe.

22

that Mr. Estrada and Mr. Omar both came to the preliminary

23

hearing.

24

referred as their pastor whose name was Russ.

25

the K-2 Church and he's in charge - he was at the time in

Q

there's

In order to do that for the preliminary

They were able to do that and when they did

When they did so they brought a person they
He's part of

3
---·········-----···----

.

-··- -----··-· --··-----

I
I:

1

charge of community outreach, so a lot of his, a lot of his

2

job and a lot of his responsibilities dealt with, you know,

3

getting to know the people in the area, watching out for

4

them, helping them out, helping them through the process.

5

Russ was the person who was the contact 'cause, of course,

6

these two homeless people don't have cell phones or any way

7

that I can contact them regularly.

8

the prelirn and I had spoke with Russ and spoke with them at

9

the prelim and asked them if it's okay if I go through Russ

Russ had brought them to

10

to contact them and let them know when we get a trial date

11

and they agreed to that, both Mr. Estrada and Mr. Omar did

12

that.

13

subpoena.

14

about a month ago.

15

opportunity to serve both Mr. Omar and Mr. Estrada those

16

subpoenas letting them know the court date and letting them

17

know that they needed to be here.

18

I maintained some contact with Russ just to make sure that he

19

tabs on them as the trial was getting closer.

20

job for another job and his replacement, Jason, whose here

21

today with Mr. Omar,

22

kind of taking over for Russ and was aware of the situation,

23

was able to verify that indeed Russ did serve the subpoena on

24

Gabriel Estrada.

25

weeks Mr. Estrada has come into some trouble.

I kept in contact with Russ and I had emailed him a
Russ informed me - and I emailed that subpoena
Russ informed that he did have the

Now, he since that time -

Russ left that

they're in the conference room.

He was

They both informed me that in the last few
He was in jail
4
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1

at one point.

2

now,

3

it again about a week ago and I checked yesterday to see if

4

he'd been returned to jail, he's not.

5

this point.

I checked the jail yesterday,

he's not there

he was actually released on September 24th.

We checked

So he's not in jail at

Mr. Omar and the community pastor have let me know

6

I guess Mr. Omar and Mr.

7

that they've lost touch with him.

8

Estrada have kind of had a falling out and so they were

9

concerned that he may not be here today.

He did have a

10

subpoena, he did know about the court date but - and again,

11

Jason,

12

for Gabriel the last couple of days to see if he saw him to

13

make contact with him.

14

around in that area any more and he's kind of involved with a

15

different crowd, but again, his whereabouts are unknown.

16

the new cowmunity outreach person,

He did not.

Our position,

Your Honor,

I had him watching

He said he doesn't run

is that we have - he's

17

been served by process and we 1 ve gone to additional means to

18

try to find this witness, he's unavailable and so again,

19

is going to take a two-part test.

20

unavailability now and so the Court asked for a proffer of

21

what we've done,

22

attendance,

23
24

25

this

So I'm just addressing

that's what we've done to try to procure his

he's not here today.

THE COURT:

All right.

Do you want to address

different steps or do you want - that's fine.
MR. LEAVITT:

And we can address unavailability and
5
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l
1

then if we get to there I think we can address the rule.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. VENABLE:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. VENABLE:

All right,

thank you.

Your Honor,

I'll address

-

Mr. Venable then.
In the United States Supreme Court

6

and the Utah Courts have held that the right to confront

7

witnesses at trial and to provide the fact finder an

8

opportunity to access their credibility, cannot be lightly

9

dismissed.

I know the Court of Appeals in State v. Tron said

10

that for a witness to be constitutionally unavailable,

11

must practically impossible to produce the witness in court

12

and,

13

that the witness was unavailable but that was because the

14

O.A. subpoenaed that witness three times,

15

detective on the case search for him, go to the last known

16

addresses. They had the detective, you know,

17

members. Detective search consisted of questioning police

18

informants,

19

County investigators to try and procure the attendance of

20

that witness.

21

even served by, you know, a member of the police or the

22

attorney's office,

23

along.

24

unavailability.

25

you know,

in this case,

it

in State v. Tron, they found

they had their

calling family

searching police files and working with Salt Lake

You know,

in this case the subpoena wasn't

it was emailed to a pastor and then passed

That's just simply not enough to meet the prong of

THE COURT:

Thank you.
6

1

Any further response on that?

2

MR. LEAVITT:

Our response,

Your Honor,

is simply

3

as far as different cases that have addressed the issue,

4

Brown vs. Heathman,

5

didn't even try to serve the person because they didn't they

6

were here because they didn't know where they were and so

7

they didn't even serve them and the Court in that case -

8

I have copies for counsel

the 1987 case in Utah,

in that one they

and

[inaudible].

In that case, Your Honor,

9

in

you can simply look at

10

page,

Page 3 it just says at the very bottom of that

11

Paragraph 2 at the very bottom,

12

an inability of attendance of a witness the opponent must -

13

of prior testimony must always attempt service of process.

14

But then it talks about other reasonable means and does not

15

require (inaudible) attempt to serve a subpoena on a witness.

16

We served a subpoena on the witness here.

17

than this.

(inaudible)

in order to show

We've gone further

As far as the notion that when we start arguing

18
19

ability to cross examine and confront a witness,

again,

we'll

20

get to that when we get to the prior testimony but the issue

21

that that raises is whether or not Mr. Goins has had the

22

opportunity to confront and cross examine the witness.

23

we are asking the Court to offer is prior preliminary hearing

24

testimony.

25

opportunity to cross examine Mr. Estrada about this.

What

Ms. Singleton who is his attorney now had the
They
7
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1

had an opportunity to confront him about everything that's

2

going to be coming in.

3

examination.

4

Court didn't stop the cross examination, the Court didn't

5

limit the cross examination.

6

examine him and ferret out any truth or bias or anything that

7

they wanted to do and that's what he's entitled to

8

constitutionally.

9

hearing,

10

There was a complete cross

There were not even any objections made and the

Defense was able to cross

He was given that right at the preliminary

it's a complete transcript.

That's what we're

asking to offer.

11

Under - I suppose now is probably as good a time as

12

any to talk about where we're offering the exception which is

13

804(b) (1) which is former testimony and indeed it is

14

testimony that was given at a hearing and is now offered

15

against the party who had an opportunity and similar motive

16

to develop and cross and redirect examination which they were

17

able to do.

18

As far as his right to confront a witness, he's had

19

that right with this testimony.

20

statement, we're not offering an out-of-court statement.

21

was a statement that was made in court, at a prior proceeding

22

in this case under oath in which Mr. Goins had ample

23

opportunity to confront and cross examine the witness.

24
25

Again,

We're not offering an 1102
It

are there more things that we could do?

Sure, we could send out, we could send out an army of people
8

_
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1

to try to find that person but that's not what we're required

2

to do under the rule.

3

persuaded that we have acted in good faith,

4

diligence to try to locate a witness and we've been unable to

5

do so.

6

with, with this homeless man,

7

served him a subpoena.

8

he's not here.

9

that they're absent from the trial and we've not been able to

The requirement is that the Court is

We have done that.

with reasonable

The one person who I had contact
I maintained that contact.

He

Mr. Estrada has that subpoena and

The rule says that if the person is served,

10

get them by process, that's what that subpoena is.

11

served in process.

12

reasonable means.

13

other reasonable means to locate people who know him and try

14

to find him but we've been unable to do that.

15

matter because he was served a subpoena.

16

and we've done what we can to get him here.

17

confrontation right has been fulfilled, we're offering

18

preliminary hearing testimony and nothing else.

That's it.

THE COURT:

20

confrontation issue?

But it doesn't

He's not here today
Again,

the

Do you want to address the

MS. SINGLETON:
Your Honor,

We don't even get to

We've gone above that and tried to go to

19

21

He was

Yes, Your Honor I can address that

22

issue.

the Supreme Court of Utah has held that

23

the

24

preliminary hearings and although,

25

admission of former testimony, you know, as far as having had

(inaudible) confrontation law does not apply to
under the rules for the

9

------------------~
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1

an opportunity, a prior opportunity to cross examine the

2

witness which, yes, there was a preliminary hearing in this

3

case and yes, we did have the opportunity to cross examine

4

Mr. Estrada, I would submit that that is - that would still

5

violate my client's right to confront and c~oss examine the

6

witnesses against him by admitting this testimony at trial.

7

The reason being that under 804 (b) ( 1) (b)

8

states that you had an opportunity and similar motive to

9

develop it by direct, cross, or redirect examination and in

it specifically

10

these preliminary hearings there is an abbreviated procedure

11

and quite frankly,

12

testimony is different at a preliminary hearing than it is at

13

trial.

14

hearings that we would not ask at trial because evidence is

15

admissible at trial - or at a preliminary hearing but not

16

necessarily is admissible in a trial.

17

are different and - or, or by the same token, we don't ask

18

question that we might ask at a trial because credibility

19

determinations are not being made a preliminary hearing.

20

Court making the probable cause determination is not

21

assessing the credibility of a witness, therefore we do not

22

ask those questions to get that information out.

23

believe that the motive of developing that testimony is the

24

same at a preliminary hearing as it would be at trial and

25

therefore it would violate my client's right to confront and

Your Honor, the motive in developing

We frequently ask questions during preliminary

The rules of evidence

The

So I don't

10
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1

cross examine the witnesses against him by admitting this

2

testimony, the preliminary hearing testimony at trial.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. LEAVITT:

Thank you.
May I just briefly address the S~xth

5

Amendment issue?

6

Sixth Amendment right to confrontation would not apply to

7

prelim, that's being used in reverse here.

8

saying is that you don't get every single witness at a

9

preliminary hearing.

The fact the Supreme Court said that that

What they're

You don't get to have that right to

10

confront them.

Now, when they're there and you've confronted

11

them, that right to confrontation has been fulfilled.

12

what that case is saying is it's saying that reliable hearsay

13

can be admitted at a preliminary hearing and you can't insist

14

on every single witness being at a preliminary hearing,

15

the reverse.

16

right may be fulfilled at the preliminary hearing, it's just

17

that they can't necessarily assert that right at a

18

preliminary hearing, and again, as we know, as a matter

19

(inaudible) every - in this instance had I objected to say,

20

Hey, these are questions about credibility, this is beyond

21

the scope of this hearing and Ms. Singleton had been shut

22

down,

23

examination.

24

cross examination at every single prelim, we talk about

25

inferences, statements, we talk about bias, we talk about all

But

not

~-

It's not that you don't have that right, that

I can see how possibly they didn't get a complete cross
But as we know, as a matter of course, every

11

1

of these things that she's saying they don't have a motive to

2

do but that's what the cross examination at preliminary

3

hearing is about.

4

witness,

5

admitted.

They had an opportunity to confront that

it's been fulfill~d and

~o

th~ testimony should be

All right, thank you.

6

THE COURT:

7

I'm going to address first of all the initial prong

8

of whether or not this witness is actually unavailable and

9

the parties have been willing to do as I ask,

to just go on

10

proffer of what the State has done.

11

to accept those proffers with out contesting the proffers of

12

what they've done to serve him without bringing in the -

13

without hearing from Jason I guess is who the witness we have

14

here.

15

availability issue goes?

16

MS. SINGLETON:

17
18

Are both parties willing

Are you willing to accept those proffers as far as the

I'll accept the proffer, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

All right and I do find that based on

19

the proffer of what the State has done to procure this

20

witness's testimony,

21

far as that first prong goes.

22

that he is unavailable under Rule 804 as

The key for that for me is that he knew about when

23

this hearing was,

24

done by law enforcement officer or a pastor or a friend or a

25

neighbor or a spouse or someone's whose at the home when it's

I mean, whether the service is actually

12

·-····-· ........

.

...........

---··-------·-·----------

1

delivered by ma·il,

2

someone is unavailable if they really do not know when this

3

trial is.

4

he was in jail and released from jail on September 24th was

5

aware of this court date and had,

6

preliminary hearing,

7

finding that for the requirements of Rule 804 - and we are

8

dealing specifically with subsection A,

9

that the State did do reasonable means of process and,

the key is is I cannot find fairly that

All indications are that this person, even before

in fact,

come to a

so knew the proceeding was going.

I am

sub-5 in this case,
in

10

fact,

11

get Mr. Estrada here and he is not here.

12

appeared.

13

we're an hour past the time when he would have been

14

subpoenaed to have come in and meet with them and he is not

15

present.

16

due process has actually occurred as far as trying to
He has not

This is the time set for this hearing,

in fact

As we go to the next prong and that is the next

17

part of this analysis,

18

to confrontation is met if the defendant, defense counsel or

19

opposing counsel of the witness has had an opportunity to

20

cross examine under circumstances that would provide a

21

similar motive.

22

type of a cross examination and opportunity that it meets the

23

criteria needed for Rule 804?

24

preliminary hearing. Has that been given to me and I just

25

don't, haven't received it electronically?

argument has been made that the right

That is what's key here, was it the same

---------·-··-··•·-····-·-- -

I have not read the

----·-----·------------------

MR. LEAVITT:

1

2

I have a copy, Your Honor,

Court.

3

THE COURT:

4

tbpy-bf it so I'll··use yours -

How do the parties,

MS. SINGLETON:

5
6

for the

I do need to have a

Your Honor, we don't have a copy of

that.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. LEAVITT:

9

THE COURT:

I don't know that it had been filed It's the first witness - electronically and the attorneys are

10

the same.

Mr. Leavitt,

11

preliminary hearing and Ms. Singleton you were the attorney?

12

MR. LEAVITT:

13

THE COURT:

you were the prosecutor at the

Yes.
And what is the process that the

14

parties anticipate in doing this, that they would actually

15

have role players get up and read and just do this exchange?
MR. LEAVITT:

16

17

options.

18

this was created from.

I think there's probably a couple of

Ms. Singleton has the audio of that which is where

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. LEAVITT:

Oh,

okay.

I would like,

I would suggest that if

21

we can play it and see if it plays clearly on the court's

22

system I think if it comes in,

23

good enough.

24

possibly playing it and following along with the transcript.

25

Since we have an audio,

I think playing the audio is

If it's fuzzy and you can't hear it very well,

I prefer to do that than have role
14

~----------------~-----

1

players.

That's sort of awkward but we can do it that way if

2

the Court prefers as well.

3

THE COURT:

And any suggestions as far as how the

4·

·defer'fse would like that to go?

And l

realize· we' re ·one· -step-

s

ahead of my ruling here but it gives me some anticipation as

6

to what the opportunities and fairness ...

7

MS. SINGLETON:

I guess, Your Honor, I think either

8

we just - I think we probably should just play it.

9

want to have, I don't want the jury to be reading it.

I

don't
I

10

don't know that we necessarily need to have it be role played

11

but, but as a followup argument, Your Honor, with respect to

12

the admission of this testimony, a lot of what - as the Court

13

if you read through it, a lot of what this is are Mr. Estrada

14

making motions that are not, again, they're not really

15

adequately described I don't think.

16

very unclear and potentially, you know, confusing or

17

prejudicial to my client and to the jury to be listening to

18

something or reading something that's not, that isn't clear

19

in terms of what he's referring to or what motions he's

20

actually making.

21

THE COURT:

I think it's going to be

Part of my question in that is even if

22

the testimony is allowed is either party asking to strike any

23

of the preliminary hearing testimony or is the motion that

24

the testimony as it was?

25

MR. LEAVITT:

I don't have anything to strike.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -·--··-·--·------

THE COURT:

1

Okay.

And there's nothing stricken

2

here and there hasn't been a copy provided with anything that

3

would be objectionable and as Mr. Leavitt has suggested in

4"" . ,.. his· argument,
5

on.

Am

I ··don't ·see even any objections ·that··were ··rul-ed

I missing any?
MS. SINGLETON:

6

No,

Your Honor,

I don't believe so.

7

The one thing that I think should be stricken from this if it

8

were admitted is there are some, at some point there is a

9

reference to an allegation made by

Mr. Estrada that my client

10

had previously stolen his bike which I think would be

11

essentially 404B evidence of which we've had no notice of an

12

intent to introduce that kind of thing.

13

THE COURT:

14

MS. SINGLETON:

15

Honor,

MR. VENABLE:

17

MS.

18

THE COURT:

20

21

185ish,

SINGLETON:

186.

(Inaudible)

that's 185 and then -

I do have 185 where he talks about

"when I found out my bike ended up missing"?

MR. LEAVITT:

If that's all there is, I don't even

see that accusation there.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. LEAVITT:

24

THE COURT:

25

It would have been, I'm sorry, Your

(inaudible) .

16

19

What line and page do you have?

I just see it Pretty innocuous to me.
- No. 185.

All right.

That - it's

really kind of peripheral to the issue that I have to make.

.J

- - - - ~ - - - · - - · · - · - · · · · ~ - - 1 6.

1

Now that I have had an opportunity to -

2

MS. SINGLETON:

3

THE COURT:

Your Honor, if I could -

Yeah, uh-huh

MS. S'!NGLETON:'

(affirmative).

- •jus·t· make ···one· more··point--·about, --r

5

mean, with respect to what I would have done differently,

6

know,

in terms of THE COURT:

7

8

you

'Cause that is the issue, that's the

argument.
MS. SINGLETON:

9

Right, and that, you know, there

10

are a lot of comments, you know, and statements that Mr.

11

Estrada made during this that I believe go to his credibility

12

in terms of, you know, you know, he kind of goes back and

13

forth on some issues about where he was the night before,

14

he knew and the last time he saw my client was and the last

15

time, you know,

16

that I did not develop as thoroughly as,

17

have, as I was intending to do today in the trial because it

18

didn't matter at the preliminary hearing.

19

focusing on was more of the, you know,

20

encounter and so again, with respect to the motive, it was

21

not the same motive to cross.

22

23
24

25

how

and a lot of that goes to his credibility and

THE COURT:

Okay.

you know,

I would

What we were

facts of the actual

Any further response on that

argument?
MR. LEAVITT:

I think the same motive is there.

If

you look at the transcript, anytime you look at what we do in

17

·----·-···------------------- -----------·-·-•···--·----····•

-.

1

the court we can see different things that we may have done

2

differently or may have done better, .that doesn't mean that

3

we didn't have a motive to ferret out the truth or to

5

THE COURT:

All right.

All right.

This takes an

6

analysis of the rule itself and the purposes behind the rule.

7

If the opportunity to cross examine at a preliminary hearing

8

that is required by this rule meant that the defense attorney

9

needed to be able to see into the future and know that this

10

is the testimony that would be using at trial and to cross as

11

though you would at trial to test credibility issues,

12

the rule would be meaningless.

13

what the rule requires.

14

then

So I don't find that that's

What it requires is an opportunity to cross with a

15

similar motive.

16

in just the last little while that this has been an issue

17

where I said that the opportunity for cross examination was

18

not there precisely because every question was met with an

19

objection because it wasn't the sort of thing that needed to

20

be dealt with at preliminary hearing or it was - that was

21

something that would be saved for trial and even though the

22

defense attorney had been in court and been able to stand up

23

and question the witness,

24

opportunity for cross.

25

There are cases and,

in fact, multiple cases

there really had been no meaningful

That simply is not the case here.

This is a case
18

..

-··-···

-··---··------------·--------'

1

where this witness was on the stand under oath, testifying as

2

to the exact incidents that are at issue here and this is

3

precisely the circumstances that Rule 804 allows and I am

4-

· admitting,·••·I• am.ruling for••••the•State •in. -this.that -the.

5

admission of the preliminary hearing testimony of Gabriel

6

Estrada is appropriate under Rule 804(a) (5); however,

7

still needs to be a clean presentation of this to the jury.

8
9

there

The concern about presenting a jury a written
statement means I don't ever do that because it just gives

10

too much weight when they see something in writing and

11

everything else is by question and answer at trial.

12

parties agree that the recording is a way to do it, then that

13

is something that I will consider looking to that

14

stipulation.

15

Q

If the

Another way to do it - and sometimes that's the

16

cleaner way to do it is just simply have parties role playing

17

that questioning so that the jury is seeing it the same way

18

and in that type of a situation the parties can go through

19

and with rulings by the Court, strike anything that is not

20

appropriate coming in.

21

objection on that and it may be that the statement about the

22

taking of the bike earlier is for prior acts that you want to

23

have stricken.

24

the - I noted that there was a part where another witness

25

comes in in the middle and it's kind of disruptive and very

So far there's only been the only

It may be that there can be some cleaning of

19

' - - - - - - - - · · · - · ..

-

·•-··-····-···.

.. ••···-·---""·-····-·-•·•-·······-·------··••-·--·-·--·-····-·••·••--·····--·--·-·---J

1

often at preliminary hearing, preliminary hearing are work

2

hearings and extraneous things are going on.

3

the cleaner way.

That's usually

Because we don't have the jury coming in

today· we do have some time to do that· and so I am· instructing··
5

the attorneys to get together, given my ruling that I am

6

going to allow the preliminary hearing upon which Mr. Estrada

7

was cross examined that the defendant at least had the

8

opportunity for cross examination to come in and look at how

9

they want to present it without any of the extraneous of

10

other matters happening.

11

MR. LEAVITT:

12

THE COURT:

13

Anything else We can discuss that.

Anything else we need to address on

this issue itself?

14

MS. SINGLETON:

15

THE COURT:

Not on this issue, Your Honor.

Are there other preliminary issues?

16

Now we do have I believe - we don't need to take all day that

17

we were planning to go for trial but we do have some time so

18

that we can immediately get to the issues.

19

have already been presented.

20

I think MS. SINGLETON:

21
22

Jury instructions

Has the defense presented some?

I do have them, Your Honor, right

here.
THE COURT:

23

Okay, so I've got that and we can go

24

over that.

25

prepared by the State because that was an issue on another

I smiled at the verdict form that had been

20

-------------··········--·--·-··-··-·-·-·--·------·-····-----·-··-··-··------·------

----- - . _J

Addendum D

INSTRUCTION NO.

·z_.y

You are instructed that the laws of Utah do not require a defendant to establish
self-defense by a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence. The laws of Utah require the
defendant to bring forward some evidence which tends to show self-defense. If the defendant
has done this, and if such evidence of self-defense, when considered in connection with all other
evidence in this case, raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, then you must find
him not guilty.
The defendant has no particular burden of proof but is entitled to an acquittal if there is
any basis in the evidence from either side sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.
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